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ON A HITHERTO NEGLECTED TEXT  
AGAINST BUDDHIST PERSONALISM:  
*Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 18.92–103 and its *Bhāṣya*

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*Aux anges, aux mânes  
et aux eaux de Kyōto*

*Abstract*<sup>1</sup>

According to the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing, the Sāṃmitīya sect of Buddhism, an offshoot of the Vātsīputrīya sect, had become by far the most important among the non-Mahāyānist denominations of the northern half of India by the turn of the 7<sup>th</sup> century CE. Now, the Sāṃmitīyas were famous for professing a personalist doctrine (*pudgalavāda*) that singled them out as “heretics” and triggered off vehement criticism on the part of their “coreligionists.” Whereas only a few Sāṃmitīya works have survived down to us in Chinese translation, most of their opponents’ tracts have been preserved either in Sanskrit or in Tibetan translation, the most celebrated ones being those of Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti and Kamalaśīla. However, one of the earliest extant Yogācāra sources, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (*bhāṣya*), dedicates a section of respectable length to the critique of Buddhist personalism. The present essay provides this neglected early testimony with an introduction, an annotated translation, and text-critical notes.

- 1 The present study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 “Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus”) and the Numata Foundation, which allowed me to spend three and a half months in Kyoto (Ryukoku University). Thanks are due to Prof. Shoryu Katsura who invited me in Kyoto and succeeded in making my stay there an unforgettable event; to Kazuo Kano, who generously put at my disposal his still provisional edition of Vairocanarakṣita’s *Sūtrālaṅkāravivṛti*; to Kensho Okada for sending me his excellent MA-thesis and two articles he wrote with Sayaka Kishi; to Chizuko Yoshimizu, who enabled me to meet these distinguished young scholars of Tsukuba University (and spend two rainy but happy days in Kobuchizawa); to Isabelle Ratié, who made very insightful remarks on this essay.

## 1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique

### 1.1.

According to Bareau, the Vātsīputrīya sect branched off from the Sthavira group of early Buddhism some time during the first half of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BCE.<sup>2</sup> Around the turn of the Common Era, the Vātsīputrīya movement gave rise to four sub-sects: the Bhadrāyānīyas, the Dharmottarīyas, the Śaṅṅagarīkas (or: Śaṅṅagirīkas) and the Sāṃmitīyas (or: Sāṃmatīyas).<sup>3</sup> Except for the Śaṅṅagarīkas, these sub-sects are attested epigraphically from the 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE on: in Mathurā and Sārnāth (Sāṃmitīyas, resp. 2<sup>nd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> century CE), in Karle and Junnar (Dharmottarīyas, 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE), in Nāsik and Kanheri (Bhadrāyānīyas, 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE).<sup>4</sup> While the history and ideas of the first three sub-sects are shrouded in mystery, it seems very likely that the Sāṃmitīyas gained prominence and eventually eclipsed even the mother-sect, the Vātsīputrīyas.<sup>5</sup> And if the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing is to be trusted, by the 7<sup>th</sup> century CE, the Sāṃmitīyas had become by far the numerically most important group among the few surviving non-Mahāyānist denominations (Sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras). Their area of influence extended from the lower Indus to the lower Ganges with nearly hegemonic strongholds in Sindh (about 100 monasteries and 10'000 monks), Mālava (about 100 monasteries and 20'000 monks) and, most importantly perhaps, Valabhī, where a huge monastic complex (*vihāraṃḍala*) and intellectual centre flourished since the beginning of the 6<sup>th</sup> century under Maitraka patronage.<sup>6</sup> Interestingly enough, certain among the doctrines of this important Buddhist denomination have been held consistently by all other Buddhist groups to be a *heresy* – a deviation – known as “personalism” (*pudgalavāda*).<sup>7</sup> In other words, whatever the representativity of

2 See Bareau 1955:33 and 114.

3 For a legendary account of this schism, see Bareau 1955:122–123 and Lusthaus 2009:285.

4 See Bareau 1955:36. For references, see Bareau 1955:122nn. 2–3, 127n. 4, 128n. 4.

5 Note, in this connection, Yaśomitra's explanation of “*vātsīputrīya*” in AKVy 699,3: *vātsīputrīyā āryasāṃmatīyāḥ*. *Āryasāṃmitīya* also occurs at MAV 268,7 (*'phags pa maṅ pos bkur ba pa*).

6 See Bareau 1955:36 and 121–122. All in all, the Sāṃmitīya sect amounted to about 65'000 monks and 1'000 monasteries (16'000/500 for the Sarvāstivādins, 20'000/200 for the Sthaviras).

7 On this translation, see Chau 1984:7. Note that the expressions “Pudgalavādin/Pudgalavāda” (in much the same way as “Hīnayāna”) refers neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school, but rather to the (alleged) representatives of a set of doctrines based on the

personalism within the Sāṃmitīya monastic communities, the most powerful among the non-Mahāyānist denominations was deemed heretic by most of its coreligionists.<sup>8</sup> During centuries, from the *Kathāvatthu* to Kamalaśīla, the intellectual elite of all other groups and/or schools (Theravādins; Vaibhāṣikas, Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntika, “epistemologists,” etc.) shaped ever more sophisticated arguments against the Vātsīputrīya and/or Sāṃmitīya *pudgalavāda*. But what did these Buddhist personalists – apparently a contradiction in terms – teach?<sup>9</sup>

## 1.2.

While shaping their doctrine of the *pudgala*, the Buddhist personalists are likely to have attempted to solve several problems they felt were left open by the dominant interpretation of the Buddha’s Law in strict terms of selflessness and impermanence. These problems pertained to issues such as memory and knowledge, serial continuity, ethical responsibility, eschatology, soteriology and, last but not least, salvation and the nature of the liberated saint. Interestingly enough, a good deal of these problems and their solutions clearly

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notion of *pudgala*, and always through the lenses of their opponents. To the best of my knowledge, no Indian Buddhist thinker has ever used this rather deprecative label as a self-designation.

8 If the term is appropriate at all under such circumstances, for the Buddhists of all persuasions who thought of themselves as “orthodox” (i.e., non-Pudgalavādins) held contradictory opinions on the issue of whether the Pudgalavādins were Buddhists or not. “Coreligionists” (*svayūthyā*) appears in MSAVBh (see below, n. 53), MAV 244,8 (*raṇ gi sde pa maṇ pos bkur pa*; \**svayūthyāḥ sāmmitīyāḥ*) and 286,12, and “Buddhist” (*bauddha*) in MSAVBh (see below, n. 72) and AKVy 699,4–5 (*na hi vātsīputrīyāṇāṃ mokṣo neṣyate / bauddhatvāt /*). But to authors such as Vasubandhu, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaramati, the Pudgalavādins are at best “pseudo-Buddhists” (*saugataṃmanyā*) and “outsiders from within” (*antaścaraṭīrthika*). See AKBh 472,13–15: *tasmād dṛṣṭyārbudam etasmin śāsana utpannam ya eṣa ekeṣāṃ pudgalagrāha ekeṣāṃ sarvanāstītiāgrāhaḥ / ye 'pi ca dravyāntaram evāt-mānaṃ manyante fīrthakārās teṣāṃ eva mokṣābhāvadoṣo niṣkampaḥ /*, TS 336: *kecit tu saugataṃmanyā apy ātmānaṃ pracakṣate / pudgalavyapadeśena tattvānyatvādivarjitam //*, and BCAP 328,28–329,1: *pudgalavādinā tu punar antaścaraṭīrthikāḥ / skandhebhyaḥ tattvānyatvābhyām avācyaṃ pudgalanāmānam ātmānam icchati / anyathā fīrthika-siddhāntābhiniveśadarśanaṃ syāt / āha ca – kecit ca saugataṃmanyā apy ātmānaṃ pracakṣata\* iti /*. \*= TS 336. See also the other texts discussed in *Kośa* V.228.

9 On the doctrines of the Pudgalavādins, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Bareau 1955:114–130, Chau 1984, Chau 1987, Lusthaus 2009.

foreshadow the later debates on *ātman/anātman* between Buddhist and non-Buddhists intellectuals.<sup>10</sup>

### 1.3.

According to nearly all doxographic accounts, the Vātsīputrīyas' and Sāṃmitīyas' main thesis was the following: "La personne (*pudgala*) est perçue (*upalabhyate*) comme une réalité évidente (*sākṣātkr̥taparamārthena*). La personne n'est ni identique (*sama*) aux agrégats (*skandha*) ni différente (*viśama*) d'eux. Elle n'existe ni dans les agrégats ni en dehors d'eux."<sup>11</sup> But did the Pudgalavādins really claim, as all their opponents would like them to do, that the *pudgala* ultimately exists (as *°paramārthena* would suggest), i.e., that it exists as a substantial (*dravyasat*), independent (< *bhāvāntara*) entity? According to most of the rare extant Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya sources,<sup>12</sup> the doctrine of the *pudgala* was meant to provide a satisfactory account of Buddhism as a middle way (*madhyamā pratipad*) between the extremes of eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) and annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*). This seems at least to be the meaning of the personalists' statement to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be said (*avaktavya*) to be either the same as or distinct from the five aggregates. For if the *pudgala* is the same as the *skandhas*, it will be as conditioned (*samskr̥ta*) and hence momentary (*kṣanika*) as they are, and one can no longer account for recollection, continuity and moral responsibility. But if the *pudgala* is independent from the *skandhas*, it will be as eternal and unconditioned as the non-Buddhists' *ātman*, and then any relationship with psycho-physical reality and need for religious life (*brahmacarya*) will be lost.<sup>13</sup> By claiming that their *pudgala* was neither an eternal and independent entity nor an impermanent entity reducible to the psycho-physical constituents, the Pudgalavādins expected not only to provide the middle way with a doctrinal foundation, but also to disclose the rationale

10 In this regard, the SŚ provides a fascinating example of a still purely intra-Buddhistic controversy on exegetical and philosophical issues.

11 Bareau 1955:115 (Vātsīputrīya), to be compared with Bareau 1955:123 (Sāṃmitīya).

12 On this literature, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Bareau 1955:115 and 122, Chau 1984:7–8, Chau 1987:34–35 and 43–44, Lusthaus 2009:278–285.

13 TDS 19c35: "Il est impossible de dire que l'être (*sattva: pudgala*) est différent des caractéristiques, il serait [en conséquence] éternel (*śāśvata*); et, s'il était identique aux caractéristiques, il serait non éternel (*aśāśvata*). Ces deux erreurs ne peuvent être commises." Translation Chau 1987:40.



behind the Buddha's refusal to answer the question whether the soul (*jīva*) is identical to or different from the body.<sup>14</sup>

#### 1.4.

To claim that the *pudgala* does not exist as a substantial entity is tantamount to saying that it exists as a designation (*prajñaptisat*).<sup>15</sup> This is indeed what the personalists did while developing a sophisticated system supposed to account for the *pudgala* as a designation.<sup>16</sup> According to them, the *pudgala* is liable to three *prajñaptis*: the *pudgala* as designated by the basis/bases (*\*āśrayaprajñapta-pudgala*), the *pudgala* as designated by transmigration (*\*saṃkramaprajñapta-pudgala*), and the *pudgala* as designated by cessation.<sup>17</sup> What does “basis/bases” (*āśraya*) refer to? First and foremost, to the five aggregates, but also, according to the context, to the four great elements (*mahābhūta*), the twelve sensory bases (*āyatana*) and the eighteen sensory elements (*dhātu*). The *pudgala* as designated with reference to these bases is that which appropriates (*upāḍā-*) and sustains the body, serves as an agent of perceptual awareness (*viññāna*),<sup>18</sup> affective sensation (*vedanā*) and ideation (*saṃjñā*), provides the basis for recollection and knowledge, is the possessor of serial continuity (*santāna*). And according to the Buddhist personalists, the relationship between the *pudgala* and the psycho-physical basis is the same as that between fire and fuel, which are neither identical nor distinct.<sup>19</sup> As for the *pudgala* as designated by transmigration, it refers to that which underlies the rebirth stories (*jātaka*) of the (future) Buddha and passes from one existence to another.<sup>20</sup> This designation is threefold: desi-

14 On the *avyākṛtavastus*, see below, n. 71.

15 On the distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat* (pseudo-)entities, see below, n. 54. See also Lusthaus 2009:276–278.

16 Note the wording of thesis no. 1 in Vasumitra's account: “The *pudgala* is neither the same [as] nor different from the *skandhas*. It is a *prajñapti* dependent on the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*.” Translation Lusthaus 2009:284.

17 On these three *prajñaptis*, see Chau 1984:9–11, Chau 1987:35–39, Venkata Ramanan 1953: 182–195, and Lusthaus 2009:280–281.

18 Note thesis no. 15 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to the *Vibhāṣā*): “La personne (*pudgala*) conçoit (*jānāti*) les choses (*dharma*).” Translation Bareau 1955:118.

19 On the analogy of fire and fuel, see below, n. 76.

20 Note thesis no. 3 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya): “Dharmas, if apart from the *pudgala*, cannot move on from a previous lifetime to a subsequent lifetime. On the basis of the *pudgala*, one can say there is transference (*saṃkrānti*).” Translation Lusthaus 2009:284; see also Bareau 1955:116. However, as the ŚŚ strongly insists upon, the *pudgala* is *never* (until the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) without a set of *skandhas*, and this is the

gnation of(/with reference to) the past (*\*atītaprajñapti*), designation of(/with reference to) the future (*\*anāgataprajñapti*), designation of(/with reference to) the present (*\*pratyutpannaprajñapti*). According to Chau, “[t]his explains (i) how personal continuity, being an uninterrupted flow of psycho-physical phenomena, not only flows in the present, but has its source in the past and continues to flow into the future, and (ii) how personal karmic responsibility is possible, such that Buddhism is no longer susceptible to the charge that it is nihilistic and immoral.”<sup>21</sup> Finally, the *pudgala* as designated by cessation points to the end of appropriation (*upādāna*). Its purpose is “to demonstrate that the Ta-thāgata or an arahant after attaining the nirvāṇa without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) (...) is the liberated person *par excellence* [referred to as *uttama*<sup>o</sup> or *paramapuriso*], dwelling in beatitude.”<sup>22</sup> To sum up: “Thus the *pudgala*, with its three designations, is an ineffable (*avaktavya*) that avoids the two extremes: annihilation (*uccheda*) and eternity (*śāśvata*). The *pudgala* is the agent of knowledge, memory, the rebirth process, the ripening of actions (*karmavipāka*), and, after eliminating its obstacles, dwells in beatitude.”<sup>23</sup>

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reason why the Pudgalavādins strongly advocated the existence of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). See thesis no. 33 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra) in Bareau 1955:119, and thesis no. 10 (according to the *Kathāvatthu*) of the Sāṃmitīyas in Bareau 1955:124. Note also Venkata Ramanan 1953:187 (and 195): “Therefore leaving the body of the five *skandhas*, when all that is extinct, the person moves on from this life to another. Hence it is said that there is the person who leaves the five *skandhas* of this state (viz.) *upapattibhava* and takes up the five *skandhas* of the *antarābhava*.”

21 Chau 1984:11, to be compared with Chau 1987:37.

22 Chau 1984:11.

23 Chau 1984:11. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting the following excerpt from the SŚ (465a17–465b1): “Le Bouddha a dit [que l]e *pudgala* existe en tant que désignation (*prajñapti*). C’est pourquoi cela s’oppose à [l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. S’il est vrai que la personne n’existe pas, alors il n’y aura pas ce qui tue ainsi que ce qui est tué. Il en est de même pour le vol, l’amour illicite, le mensonge, et l’absorption de l’alcool. C’est [la lacune de l’opinion de] l’inexistence de la personne. Si la personne n’existait pas, il n’y aurait pas non plus les cinq crimes majeurs; [si] les organes des sens ne produisaient pas les bonnes et mauvaises actions, il n’y aurait pas de lien; s’il n’y avait pas ce qui détache les liens, il n’y aurait pas ce qui est attaché également, et il n’y aurait ni acteur ni acte, ni résultat [de l’acte]. S’il n’y avait pas d’acte, il n’y aurait pas de résultat. [S’il] n’y avait pas d’acte, de résultat, il n’y aurait ni naissance, ni mort. Mais les êtres vivants, à cause des actes et de leurs résultats, transmigrent dans le cycle de la naissance et de la mort (*saṃsāra*). S’il n’y avait ni naissance, ni mort, il n’y aurait pas de cause (*hetu*) de la naissance et de la mort. S’il n’y avait pas de cause, il n’y aurait pas de cessation de cause. S’il n’y avait pas de cessation de cause, il n’y aurait pas d’orientation vers la voie (*mārga*); ainsi, il n’y aurait pas

## 1.5.

Among the many critiques of Buddhist personalism, Vasubandhu's is by far the most systematic and, quite deservedly, the most famous: to the best of my knowledge, AKBh 9 (strictly speaking not a genuine chapter of the AKBh)<sup>24</sup> has been translated in Western languages no less than thrice, not to speak of its partial translations.<sup>25</sup> Still within the Sautrāntika/Yogācāra tradition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have dedicated one section of the lengthy *Ātmaparīkṣā* of the TS(P) to the refutation of the Buddhist *pudgala*. TS(P) 336–349/(K125,16–131,9/Ś159,16–166,18), which represents the last stage in the development of anti-Pudgalavāda polemics in this tradition, has been translated into German by Schayer as early as 1931.<sup>26</sup> However, two closely related texts have escaped scholarly attention. The first one is Dharmakīrti's PVSV 147,2–148,5, which has not even been noticed so far as a critique of Pudgalavāda,<sup>27</sup> and where Dharmakīrti develops an entirely new line of argument. As for the second one, it is MSA(Bh) 18.92–103/(154,27–160,6), the text translated in the present study. This passage, which is likely to represent the very inception of the Yogācāra critique of the *pudgala*, has been translated into French as early as 1911 by Lévi and did not go unnoticed until the Second World War. In the rich "Notes préliminaires" to his translation of AKBh 9 (1926), de La Vallée Poussin writes: "[L]e Sūtrālaṅkāra d'Asaṅga (édité et traduit par S. Lévi, 1907–1911), xviii.92–

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les quatre nobles vérités (*āryasatyā*). S'il n'y avait pas les quatre nobles vérités, il n'y aurait pas de Bouddha enseignant les quatre vérités. S'il n'y avait pas de Bouddha, il n'y aurait pas de communauté des moines (*saṅgha*). Ainsi la réfutation du *pudgala* entraîne la réfutation du Triple Joyau (*triratna*) et des quatre nobles vérités. Telle est la réfutation de toutes ces opinions. C'est pourquoi la réfutation du *pudgala* fait naître les erreurs mentionnées ci-dessus, et d'autres erreurs se produisent également. Si l'on admet que la personne (*pudgala*), le soi existe, les erreurs mentionnées ci-dessus ne se produisent pas. Comme le Bouddha l'a dit dans le *sūtra*, il faut le savoir exactement. C'est pourquoi la personne existe vraiment." Translation Chau 1987:42–43; see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:177–178.

24 See already *Kośa* V.227.

25 See Stcherbatsky 1970, *Kośa* V.230–302 and Duerlinger 1989b/Duerlinger 2003; see Duerlinger 2009 and Goodman 2009. Another extremely important anti-Pudgalavādin text (strongly indebted to AKBh 9) is MAV 244,1–288,9 (explicitly against the *Sāṃmitīyas* [*maṇi poṣaṅkur pa*, MAV 244,8; see above, n. 8]; for a topical outline of the passage, see Tauscher 1981:36–39).

26 See Schayer 1931–1932.

27 This is indeed hardly surprising considering that Dharmakīrti does not even allude to the *pudgala* in this passage.

103, dépend dans une certaine mesure du Traité de Vasubandhu.<sup>28</sup> – Signalons par exemple la discussion des rapports du feu et du combustible, l’emploi des mêmes textes scripturaires, la démonstration de l’inactivité du Pudgala.”<sup>29</sup> But, due maybe to most of our contemporaries’ pitiable unwillingness to read French and failure to take into consideration the finest pieces of 20<sup>th</sup> century scholarship, this important text has since then sunk into oblivion.<sup>30</sup> That the MSA(Bh) and AKBh 9 quote the same scriptural sources is, in itself, no argument in favour of the AKBh’s indebtedness towards the MSA(Bh), since both had to counter the exegesis made of these *loci* by the Pudgalavādins themselves, i.e., are very likely to have drawn on their opponents’ treatises (as is made clear by the ŚŚ). As for the discussion on the relationship between fire and fuel, it is no argument either, for it can also be shown to occur in at least one Pudgalavāda source.<sup>31</sup> The issue of the relationship between the two texts is made still more complicated by the question whether the author of the (MSA)Bh and the author of the AKBh were or not one and the same person.<sup>32</sup> Whatever be the case, the MSA(Bh) provides extremely interesting arguments against the *pudgala* and is to be considered as an important milestone in the history of this debate.

#### 1.6.

There can be no point in attempting to summarize or paraphrase the many arguments put forward in our passage. Suffice it to say that, as nearly all Buddhist polemical tracts before the rise of the so-called epistemological literature, the MSA(Bh) uses a twofold argumentative strategy against the *pudgala*: first, by reason(ing) (*yukti*), i.e., by resorting to the first two means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), and second, by (authoritative) scriptures (*āgama*), the third means of valid cognition recognized by all the Yogācāras before Dignāga. But what does “against the *pudgala*” mean in this context? As we have seen, the Pudgalavādin claims that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either identical to or different from the *skandhas*. His adversary summons him to make a choice: either does the *pudgala* exist as a substantial entity (*dravyasat*), and then it *must* be either the same as or distinct

28 Note that the MSA (if not the Bh) predates the AKBh from at least one century.

29 *Kośa* V.229.

30 No less neglected, and probably for the same reason, is the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*’s interesting refutation of the *pudgala*, translated into French by Lamotte in 1949. See *Traité* II.735–750.

31 See below, n. 76.

32 For a summary and new light on this problem, see Franco/Preisendanz 2010:XV–XVII.

from the *skandhas*, or it merely exists as an entity of designation (*prajñaptisat*, a “nominal fiction” [Lusthaus]), and then it can rightly be said to be neither identical to nor different from the *skandhas*. In other words, either the *pudgala* exists (as the Pudgalavādin pretends), and then the claim that it is neither the same as nor distinct from the *skandhas* is false, or it does not exist, and the silence of the Buddha in teachings such as the *Vatsagotrāsūtra* finds its justification. As for scriptural argumentation, it is made a rather complicated issue insofar as both parties rely on (supposedly) canonical literature in order to make their point.<sup>33</sup> The philosophical quarrel then turns to an exegetical one, for the Buddha, no one would dare to contend, has often made use of the notion of *pudgala*. Now, did he resort to it in a purely pragmatic and didactic purpose, as the adversary of the *pudgala* repeatedly contends, or did his statements concerning the *pudgala* refer to an *ens* – whatever its precise ontological status – as the Pudgalavādin (allegedly) has it?

## 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103

### 2.1.

One should be wary of restricting MSA(Bh) 18.92–103 to its polemical dimension, for its intra-textual context suggests yet another, soteriologically oriented meaning. Like the closely parallel chapter of the BoBh (1.17), MSA(Bh) 18 is dedicated to the factors that are “aids” to awakening (*bodhipakṣya*<sup>o</sup> or *bodhipākṣikadharma*).<sup>34</sup> In both chapters, these factors (traditionally held to amount to thirty-seven), are discussed at length in a sixteen-item list. In both chapters again, the last two items consist of three concentrations (*samādhi*) and four summary statements of doctrine (*dharmoddāna*).

### 2.2.

MSA 18.77–81/MSABh 148,6–149,12 deals with three kinds of concentration endowed each with a specific domain (*gocara*) and purpose (*artha*):<sup>35</sup> the con-

33 For a very suggestive example, see below, n. 103.

34 On the 37 *bodhipākṣikadharmas* and their various classifications, see *Traité* III.1119–1207; see also Dayal 1970:80–164.

35 On these three kinds of concentration (called also the three “doors of liberation,” *vimokṣa-mukha*), see *Traité* III.1209–1232, and *Kośa* V.184–192; in the context of the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣikadharmas*, see BoBh W276,2–277,4/D187,15–188,8. Note that, properly speak-

centration on emptiness (*śūnyatāsamādhi*) bears on and aims at the thorough knowledge (*parijñā*) of the two kinds of selflessness, viz. the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person (*pudgalanairātmya*) and of the factors (*dharmanairātmya*); the unfocused concentration (*apraṇihitasamādhi*) bears on and aims at ridding one-self (*prahāṇa*) of the basis of the (false) belief in a self (*ātmagrāha*) regarding these two selflessnesses, viz., the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (*upādānaskandha*); the signless concentration<sup>36</sup> (*ānimittasamādhi*) bears on and aims at the direct realization (*sākṣātkriyā*) of the absolute calmness (*atyantopāśama*) of the basis of this false belief.<sup>37</sup> One may wonder why, among the numerous concentrations alluded to in Buddhist literature, these three alone are listed as *bodhipāṅśika* factors. Whereas the MSA(Bh) remains silent on this point, the BoBh provides an interesting answer: “But why are only

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ing, MSA(Bh) 18.80–81/148,23–149,12 already belongs to the section devoted to the four *dharmoddānas*.

36 On the meaning of *animitta* and *ānimitta* in early Yogācāra thought, see Schmithausen 1969: 121–22n. 79.

37 To be compared with (1) the Abhidharmic understanding of the three *samādhis* as summarized by Ghoṣaka (*Abhidharmāmṛta* T 1553, 975c1–9, translated in *Traité* III.1214): “Les trois *samādhi* sont *śūnyatā-*, *apraṇihita-* et *ānimittasamādhi*. C’est parce que la pensée prend pour objet l’Anāsrava, qu’ils sont appelés *samādhi*. Concentré, l’ascète voit les cinq agrégats d’attachement (*upādānaskandha*) comme vides (*śūnya*), privés de moi (*anātman*) et de mien (*anātmīya*): voilà le *śūnyatāsamādhi*. Entré en ce *samādhi*, il ne souhaite plus amour (*rāga*), haine (*dveṣa*), aberration (*moha*) ni renaissance (*punarbhava*): voilà l’*apraṇihitasamādhi*. Il est un *samādhi* dont l’objet (*ālambana*) est exempt de dix caractères (*nimitta*). Quels sont ces dix? Les cinq objets, matière, etc. (*rūpādīpaṇcaviṣaya*), l’homme (*puruṣa*), la femme (*strī*), la naissance (*jāti*), la vieillesse (*jarā*) et l’impermanence (*anityatā*). Voilà l’*ānimittasamādhi*.” The MSA(Bh)’s ideas are much closer to the “*mādhyamika*” *Traité* (III.1223). Here, the *śūnyatāsamādhi* has two aspects: “1. Parce qu’elle considère (*samanuṣāsyati*) les cinq agrégats d’attachement (*pañca upādānaskandha*) comme n’ayant ni identité (*ekatva*) ni différence (*anyatva*), elle est ‘vide’ (*śūnya*). 2. Parce qu’elle considère le moi (*ātman*) et le mien (*ātmīya*) comme inexistants (*anupalabdha*), elle est ‘sans moi’ (*anātmaka*).” Among the four aspects of the *apraṇihitasamādhi*, two are of interest to us: “1. Parce qu’elle considère les cinq agrégats d’attachement (*pañcopādānaskandha*) comme issus de causes et de conditions (*hetupratyaya*), elle est ‘impermanente’ (*anitya*). 2. Parce qu’elle les considère comme des tourments du corps et de l’esprit (*kāyikamānasikaviheṭhana*), elle est ‘douleur’ (*duḥkha*).” As for the first two aspects of the *ānimittasamādhi*, they are as follows: “1. Parce qu’elle considère le Nirvāṇa comme la destruction de toutes les sortes de douleurs (*nānāvidhaduḥkhanirodha*), elle est ‘destruction’ (*nirodha*). 2. Parce qu’elle le considère comme l’extinction du feu du triple poison (*triviṣa*) et des autres passions (*kleśa*), elle est ‘calme’ (*śānta*).”

these three concentrations mentioned, [and] not [others] beyond these, not more than these? [Because all] this [consists of] two [things]: that which exists and that which does not exist. Among them, what is conditioned and what is unconditioned are that which exists, [whereas] that which does not exist [consists in] either the self or what belongs to the self. In this regard, the unfocused concentration is singled out (*vyavasthāna*) because it is not intent upon, i.e., because it is adverse to [that part of] existent [things that is] conditioned. As for signless concentration, it is singled out because it is intent upon, i.e., because it takes perfect delight in the unconditioned *nirvāṇa*. As for that thing which is non-existent, the bodhisattva should be neither intent upon nor non-intent upon it, but simply consider it correctly as non-existent. And one should know that it is with reference to this way of considering [non-existent things] that the concentration on emptiness is singled out.”<sup>38</sup> In other words, these three *samādhis* do not only cover the entire realm of being and non-being. They also encapsulate, so to say as its meditative counterparts, the whole Buddhist path in that they are instrumental in the bodhisattva’s reluctance towards conditioned factors, his fondness for the unconditioned *nirvāṇa*, and his rejection of false views that are responsible for defilements, entanglement in *saṃsāra* and suffering. It is, then, hardly surprising that statements of a more doctrinal nature be supplied in order to provide these all-inclusive meditative and salvational devices with a theoretical foundation. And such is indeed the case of the four summary statements of doctrine that form the last item of the *bodhipakṣya* list. As MSA 18.80ac has it, “four summary statements of doctrine have been preached [by the perfectly awakened buddhas] to the bodhisattvas as [being] the basis (*upaniṣad*) of [these three] concentrations.”<sup>39</sup> What do these summary statements of doctrine consist of? According to the BoBh, “these four summary statements of doctrine [are those] which both the buddhas and the bodhisattvas teach in order to purify the living beings. Which four [are they]? [First, there is]

38 BoBh W276,15–25/D187,24–188,5: *kasmāt punar eṣām eva trayāṇāṃ samādhināṃ prajñaptir bhavati / nāta uttari nāto bhūyaḥ / dvayam idaṃ sac cāsac ca / tatra saṃskṛtaṃ asaṃskṛtaṃ ca sad asad ātmā vātmīyaṃ vā / tatra saṃskṛte saty apraṇidhānataḥ prāṇidhānataḥ 'praṇihitasamādhivyavasthānam / asaṃskṛte punar nirvāṇe praṇidhānataḥ samyagabhiratigrahaṇato nirnimittasamādhivyavasthānam / yat punar etad asad eva vastu tatra bodhisattvena na praṇidhānaṃ nāpraṇidhānaṃ karaṇīyam / api tu tad asad\* ity eva yathābhūtaṃ draṣṭavyam / tac ca darśanam adhikṛtya śūnyatāsamādhivyavasthānaṃ veditavyam / . \*asad WT: asad asad D.*

39 MSA 18.80ac: *samādhyyupaniṣattvena dharmoddānacatuṣṭayam / deśitaṃ bodhisattvebhyaḥ [...]*.

the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all conditioned factors are impermanent. [Second, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all conditioned factors are painful. [Third, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that all factors are selfless. [Fourth, there is] the summary statement of doctrine [saying] that extinction is peaceful. Since the buddhas and bodhisattvas mainly preach (*udīrayanti*) to the living beings a doctrine whose meaning is related to them, they are called ‘summary statements of doctrine.’ And since they have been constantly proclaimed [and produced], again and again (*uditodita*),<sup>40</sup> by peacefully minded sages of old, they are called ‘summary statements.’ And since [they are] the path leading to the great[est] prosperity (*udaya*) and going upwards (*ūrdhva*) to the peak of existence, they are called ‘summary statements.’”<sup>41</sup> How do these four summary statements relate to the three above-mentioned concentrations? According to the MSABh (149,1–3), “*anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ*” and “*duḥkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ*” serve as the basis of unfocused concentration, “*anātmānaḥ sarvadharmāḥ*” as the basis of the concentration on emptiness, and “*śāntaṃ nirvāṇam*” as the basis of signless concentration.

### 2.3.

As one of the etymologizing explanations provided by the BoBh has it, “the buddhas and bodhisattvas mainly preach to the living beings a doctrine whose meaning is related” to these four summary statements. Indeed, these summaries of the Law encapsulate at least two among the latter’s most characteristic doctrinal commitments, viz. impermanence and selflessness. Now, as every

40 The BoBh is likely to pun on the two meanings of Skt. *udita*, viz. “spoken” (< √*vad*) and “born” (< *ud*√*i*), as is testified to by the interpretive Tibetan translation (BoBh<sub>tib</sub> wi D146b1): *dus rtag tu 'byuñ zññ 'byuñ ba'i phyir (uditoditatvāt < ud√i) yañ thub pa thugs zi ba sna ma rnams kyis rtag tu brjod ciñ brjod pa'i phyir (uditoditatvāt < √vad) yañ mdo zes bya'o* //.

41 BoBh W277,5–15/D188,9–16: *catvārīmāni dharmoddānāni yāni buddhāś ca bodhisattvāś ca sattvānāṃ viśuddhaye deśayanti / katamāni catvāri / anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti dharmoddānam / duḥkhāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti dharmoddānam / anātmānaḥ sarvadharmā iti dharmoddānam / śāntaṃ nirvāṇam iti dharmoddānam / etatpratisaṃyuktārthaṃ yadbhūyasā dharmam udīrayanti buddhabodhisattvāḥ sattvānāṃ / tasmād etāni dharmoddānānity ucyante / paurāṇaiś\* ca śāntamānasair munibhir uditoditatvān nityakālam uddānānity ucyante / mahodayagāminī bhavāgrordhvaḡgāminī caiṣā\*\* pratipat tasmād uddānānity ucyante / . \*paurāṇaiś em.: paurāṇeś D, purāṇaiś W; \*\*bhavāgrordhvaḡgāminī caiṣā DT: bhavāgrāc ca gāminī W. On the dharmoddānas, see also Akṣ 150,8–39 and Braarvig 1993:561–565, BoBh W277,5–284,7/D188,9–192,20, BHSD s.v. *uddāna*.*



doctrinal statement within Buddhist scholastics, these two ought to be admitted not only on the basis of scripture, but also after an evaluation through reasoning, viz. through the two remaining means of valid cognition, perception and inference. This evaluation is nearly coextensive with the insight born of (rational) reflection (*cintāmayī prajñā*) by means of which a bodhisattva assesses the truth-value of scriptural contents (*śruta*) before he subjects them to a nearly endless mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*).<sup>42</sup> And except for its conclusive statement (MSA[Bh] 18.104/160,9), the rest of MSA(Bh) 18 is devoted to the demonstration (*prasādhana*) of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*, MSA[Bh] 18.82–91/149,12–154,26) and selflessness (i.e., *pudgalanairātmya*, MSA[Bh] 18.92–103/154,27–160,6).<sup>43</sup> As we can see, rational argumentation and philosophy are first and foremost aimed at providing soteriologically relevant dogmas and the subsequent meditative practices with indisputable, supposedly value-free foundations. As our text makes clear, the proof of selflessness proceeds in a negative, polemic way by attempting to refute the coreligionists's claims to the existence of a real *pudgala* that would abandon the *skandhas* at death and take on new ones at rebirth.<sup>44</sup> But this polemical endeavour does not cease to belong to the *cintāmayī* level: the Buddhist scriptures are replete with allusions to the *pudgala*, allusions out of which fellow Buddhist doctors have developed a systematic doctrine with its own claims to legitimacy and salvational efficacy; these

42 On *yukti* and the *cintāmayī prajñā*, see Yoshimizu 1996:114–119n. 85, Deleau 2006:II.494–495n. 74 and Eltschinger 2009.

43 Note that the corresponding passage of the BoBh (W280,18–281,1/D190,17–22) contains no proof of selflessness, but the following statement: *punaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ bodhisattvaḥ saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtānāṃ dvividhaṃ nairātmyaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / pudgalanairātmyaṃ dharmanairātmyaṃ ca / tatredaṃ pudgalanairātmyaṃ yaṃ naiva te vidyamānā dharmāḥ pudgalāḥ / nāpi vidyamānadharmavinirmukto 'nyaḥ pudgalo vidyate / tatredaṃ dharmanairātmyaṃ yat sarveṣv abhilāpyeṣu vastuṣu sarvābhilāpasvabhāvo dharmo na saṃvidyate\* / evaṃ hi bodhisattvaḥ sarvadharmā anātmāna iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti /*. \*Note BoBh<sub>lib</sub> wi D148a3: *brjod par bya ba'i dños po thams cad la brjod pa'i no bo ñid kyi chos thams cad med pa ste*. “Next, the bodhisattva correctly discerns the twofold selflessness of all conditioned and unconditioned factors, [viz.] the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person and the selflessness of the factors. Among them, the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person is that neither are these [really] existing factors *pudgalas* nor is there another *pudgala* [that would be] independent of [these really] existing factors. Among them, the selflessness of the factors is that no [verbally] expressible entity possesses a factor [such as it would] have [any of] all [these verbal] expressions for its nature. And thus does the bodhisattva correctly discern that all factors are selfless.” This way of accounting for *dharmanairātmya* and *śūnyatā* is but a short sketch of the one developed at length in BoBh 1.4 (*Tattvārthapaṭala*).

44 See above, n. 20.

scriptures are, then, in need of an *ad hoc* exegesis designed to dispell doubts regarding their internal (in)consistency. One or two centuries later, however, the celebrated Buddhist polygraph Sthiramati (500–570 in Valabhī) provides an altogether different interpretation of MSA[Bh] 18.92–103/154,27–160,6: “By showing before [that all conditioned factors are] momentary, selfless[ness] has then been [*eo ipso*] demonstrated since [all] that which is momentary is [also] selfless. However, outsiders (\**ūrthika*) and ordinary people (\**laukika*) wrongly believe in the existence of a self (\**ātman*), of an agent (\**kartr*), of a seer (\**draṣṭr*), of an experiencer (\**vedaka*), of a man (\**mānava*) and of a human (\**manuja*)<sup>45</sup> that are distinct from the *skandhas*. [The MSA(Bh) now] demonstrates the selflessness of the (pseudo-)person by [adducing] other [i.e., specific logical] reasons (\**hetu*) so that [these outsiders and ordinary people] abandon their wrong notion (\**viparyāsa*).”<sup>46</sup> Although Sthiramati alludes here and there to a Sāmmitīya Buddhist opponent,<sup>47</sup> his introductory statement interprets the whole passage as a refutation of the non-Buddhists’ substantialist assumptions, thus mirroring the deep shift that took place at the turn of the 6<sup>th</sup> century CE in the aims and the targets of the Buddhist intellectuals.<sup>48</sup>

### 3. On the Present Translation

My translation is based on Sylvain Lévi’s *editio princeps* (1907, L), on the two extant Nepalese manuscripts of the MSABh (MS A/B), on the Tibetan version of the text (MSABh<sub>tib</sub>) and on Sthiramati’s massive commentary (MSAVBh, preserved in its Tibetan translation only). To these materials, one must add the text-critical footnotes of Sylvain Lévi’s French translation (1911), which often reflect

45 According to TSD 2360b, Tib. *śed* may render Skt. *manu*, while Tib. *śed bu* may render Skt. *mānava* and Tib. *śed bdag*, Skt. *ātman*. However, in an enumeration close to Sthiramati’s, Akṣ 11,29 has *śed bu* (var. *śed can*) *dañ śed las skyes*, which Braarvig (1993:II.44) renders: °*mānavamanuja*°, and which I follow for want of a better hypothesis.

46 MSAVBh tsi D162b6–7/P191a7–b1: *goñ du skad cig mar bstan pa’i sgo nas yañ gañ skad cig ma yin pa de* (em.: DP *des*) *bdag med pa yin pas de’i skabs su bdag med par* (D: P *pa*) *bsgrubs zin mod kyi / mu stegs pa dañ / ’jig rten pa dag phuñ po la ma gtogs pa’i bdag dañ / byed pa po dañ / lta ba po dañ / tshor ba po dañ / śed can dañ śed bdag la sogs pa yod par phyin ci log tu mñon par žen te / de dag gi phyin ci log dañ bral ba’i phyir gtan tshigs gžan* (D: P om. *gžan*) *gyis kyañ gañ zag la bdag med pa sgrub bo //*.

47 See below, nn. 53, 72, 73, 83.

48 See Eltschinger forthcoming 2.

a more accurate understanding of the text than the 1907 edition, and the parallel passages of AKBh 9 (generally quoted in their Sanskrit original without translation). The identification of the passages quoted or alluded to in the MSABh and the MSAVBh has been greatly facilitated by the very useful work of Kensho Okada and Sayaka Kishi (2007 and 2008), by La Vallée Poussin's footnotes to his French translation of AKBh 9 (*Kośa* V) and by Ejima's philological notes as reproduced in Lee's new edition of AKBh 9 (LE). I have also taken much benefit of Vairocanarakṣita's short glosses on the basis of Kazuo Kano's provisional edition of the *codex unicus* (Vairocanarakṣita MS). My translation and annotations owe much to my close reading of Sthiramati's MSAVBh. But how should we proceed with this bulky commentary? It is fair to say that Sthiramati's explanations were almost certainly meant for an untrained audience – for *bālas*.<sup>49</sup> In other words, most of this commentary is not worthy of a translation. I have limited myself to summarizing and paraphrasing it while providing Sanskrit equivalents (then always preceded by an asterisk). My own text-critical remarks are to be found in a separate section at the end of the translation. Although much remains to be done, I sincerely hope to have succeeded in making the text intelligible and to attract the attention of scholars to a very significant milestone in the history of the “mainstream” Buddhists' arguments against the Pudgalavāda.

#### 4. MSA(Bh) 18.92–103/154,27–160,6

In order to demonstrate the selflessness [pertaining] to the *pudgala*, [the MSA now devotes] twelve stanzas [i.e., MSA 18.92–103] to the elucidation (*vibhāga*) of selflessness:

The *pudgala* must be said to exist as a [mere] designation (*prajñāptyastitayā*), but not as a [real] substance (*dravyatas*), because one does not perceive [it], because [our pseudo-perception of the *pudgala*] is [nothing but] a wrong notion (*viparyāsa*), because it is a pollution (*saṃkleśa*), because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled (*kliṣṭa*). (MSA 18.92)

This [*pudgala*] cannot be said to be either one [and the same] with or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five *skandhas*], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the *skandhas* and the *pudgala* were one and the same,] the *skandhas* would be

49 For a good example of this, see below, n. 73.

(*prasaṅga*) the self, and [if the *skandhas* and the *pudgala* were distinct,] the [*pudgala*] would be a [real] substance. (MSA 18.93)

If [the *pudgala*] exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the *skandhas*, then you] have to state the reason (*prayojana*) [for this], [because a real *pudgala*] cannot be said to be neither one [and the same with] nor distinct [from the *skandhas*] without a reason [being provided for the denial of each of the two propositions]. (MSA 18.94)

Because of [their distinct] characteristics, because of [that which is] observed in the [ordinary] world and because of the [authoritative] treatises [that speak to the contrary], it is not correct [to affirm] that fuel and fire cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct from one another], for one indeed perceives [them] as [being] two. (MSA 18.95)

Since a cognition arises provided two [factors only] are present,<sup>50</sup> the [*pudgala*] is not [its causal] condition, because [such a *pudgala*] is useless. Therefore, the [*pudgala*] cannot be a seer, [and this] up to a liberator. (MSA 18.96)

Or, if [the *pudgala*] presided over [the rise of a cognition],<sup>51</sup> neither would it bring about a [pleasurable cognition that would be] impermanent, nor [would it ever bring about] an undesirable one. [Moreover,] its operation and characteristic are to be established. [Additionally, the Blessed One's] threefold complete awakening [would get] ruined [if the *pudgala* existed as a real substance]. (MSA 18.97)

Furthermore, its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three [faults that are to be presented below]. [Nor can the *pudgala* serve as] the [causal] condition of this effort. Seeing, etc., lacking an effort[, cannot have the *pudgala* for its agent]. (MSA 18.98)

Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [something visible], etc., cannot be self-arisen. (MSA 18.99)

Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent]. (MSA 18.100)

And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] taught [that] all *dharma*s are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and [that] to perceive a self is harmful. (MSA 18.101)

Because by [resorting to the designation of] *pudgala*, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] indicate differences in addition and [mental] series concerning defilement and purification,<sup>52</sup> which vary [each] according to degree and party. (MSA 18.102)

50 On the reading: *dvaye sati ca*, see below, text-critical remarks (→L157,3).

51 I have read: *svāmitve sati vā-* instead of: *svāmitve sati cā-*. See below, text-critical remarks (→L157,5).

52 I have read: *saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca* instead of: *saṃkleśavyavadāne ca*. See below, text-critical remarks (→L159,3).

[The Blessed One did not have to teach the *pudgala*, because] the view of a self is not to be generated [anew in the living beings], [because their] cultivation [of it] is beginningless [and therefore does not need to be taught], [and because if salvation presupposed the knowledge of the *pudgala*,] all [living beings could] achieve liberation without effort. There is either no liberation [at all] or no [substantially existing] *pudgala*. (MSA 18.103)

[The Pudgalavādin:<sup>53</sup>] Should one say that the *pudgala* exists, [or] should one [rather] say that it does not exist? [The MSA] answers: *The pudgala must be said*

- 53 Sthiramati (MSAVBh tsi D163a1–4/P191b2–6) introduces the opponent as follows: *'di ltar bcom ldan 'das kyiṣ kyaṣ so so 'i skye bo 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / rgyun du žugs pa 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / lan cig phyir 'oṇ ba 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / phyir mi 'oṇ ba 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / dgra bcom pa 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / byaṇ chub sems dpa 'i gaṇ zag daṇ / gaṇ zag gcig 'jig rten du 'byuṇ ba na 'jig rten kun la phan pa daṇ bde bar byed pa ste / 'di ltar de bžin gśegs pa 'i gaṇ zag go žes gsuṇs la / raṇ gi sde pa las kyaṇ sam* (em.: a sam D, a sam P) *bi ti pa dag phuṇ po daṇ gcig pa yaṇ ma yin / tha dad pa yaṇ ma yin pa 'i gaṇ zag rdzas su yod la / tshig gis brjod du med par yaṇ 'dod ciṇ / mu stegs pa daṇ 'jig rten pa dag bdag daṇ gaṇ zag yod par 'dod na / khyed gaṇ zag med par 'dod pa rnams gaṇ zag ces bya ba 'di yod pa žig tu 'dod dam / med pa žig tu 'dod pa smros* (D: P smos) *śig ces dri 'o //*. “The Blessed One (*\*bhagavat*) has said: ‘The [good] ordinary person (*\*pṛthagjanapudgala*), the person who has entered the stream (*\*srotaāpannapudgala*), the person who returns [only] once [to the sphere of desire] (*\*sakṛdāgāmi-pudgala*), the person who does not return [any longer to the sphere of desire] (*\*anāgā-mipudgala*), the person who is a saint (*\*arhatpudgala*), the person who is a bodhisattva (*\*bodhisattvapudgala*), and the one (*\*eka*) person who, when he appears in the world, causes welfare (*\*hita*) and happiness (*\*sukha*), i.e., the person who is a Tathāgata (*\*tathā-gatapudgala*).’” Even among [our] coreligionists (*\*svayūthyā*), the Sāṃmitīyas admit that the *pudgala*, which is neither one [and the same] as the constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality (*\*skandha*) nor distinct (*\*bhinna*) [from them], exists as a [real] substance (*\*dravyasat*) and is unspeakable (*\*avaktavya*); and the outsiders (*\*tīrthika*) as well as the worldly [persons] (*\*laukika*) admit that the self (*\*ātman*) and the *pudgala* exist. [These opponents now] ask: ‘You who admit that the *pudgala* does not exist ought to say [now] whether you accept that what is called *pudgala* exists or whether you accept that it does not exist.’” \*To be compared with Akṣ 118,26–33 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:93, and Braarvig 1993:II.452–453 for a translation); parts of the sūtra (?) are also quoted in AKBh 468,16/LE90,9 (*ekaḥ pudgalo loka utpadyamāna utpadyata iti*), TSP K126,6–7/Ś160,12–13 (*ekaḥ pudgalo loka utpadyamāna utpadyate yadvat tathāgata iti*), and SŚ (463a14 and 463c28 according to LE90n. 343 [see Venkata Ramanan 1953:170 and 173] with further references to T 2, 561a18, T 2, 569b24, AN I.22 [I, XIII, 1]). The list of the *pudgalas* in Akṣ further includes the person following his faith (*śraddhānusārī pudgalaḥ*), the person following religious teaching (*dharmaṇusārī pudgalaḥ*), the person on the eighth stage (*aṣṭamaḥ pudgalaḥ*), the person being an isolated buddha (*pratyekabuddhaḥ pudgalaḥ*). For definitions of these *pudgalas*, see Braarvig 1993:II.453–454n. 1. See also below, n. 109. Whatever its exact origin, this text belongs, according to Bareau 1955:115, to the most oft-quoted ones in Vātsīputrīya circles. On the Pudgalavādins’ original views regarding the different *pudgalas*

to exist as a [mere] designation (*prajñapti*astitā), but not as a [real] substance (*dravyatas*) [MSA 18.92ab].<sup>54</sup> <sup>55</sup>And because one can say [with equal legitimacy] that [the *pudgala*] exists as a [mere] designation [and] that it does not exist as a [real] substance, in thus adopting a conditional position (*anekāṃśavāda*) [on the *pudgala*], there is no room at all either for the fault of [affirming its absolute] existence or for the fault of [affirming its absolute] non-existence. [The *Pudgalavādin*.] But how can one know that this [*pudgala*] does not exist as a [real] substance? [Answer:] *Because one does not perceive [it]* [MSA 18.92c<sup>1</sup>]. Indeed, contrary to [*dharma*s] such as visible [things], this [*pudgala*] is not perceived as a [real] substance.<sup>56</sup> [The *Pudgalavādin*.<sup>57</sup>] But what is called “perception” [also

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engaged on the path, see Chau 1984:13–15, Chau 1987:46–48 and Venkata Ramanan 1953: 205–211.

- 54 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D163a6–7/P191b8–192a1, the MSA relies here on Akṣ (‘*phags pa blo gros mi zad pa’i mdo*) 118,34–35 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94): *gañ zag gi sgra de dag thams cad ni de bzin gsegs pa’i kun rdzob kyi tshig gi gnas kyi sams can rnams drañ ba’i phyir bstan pa ste* /. “All those words for persons are taught by the Tathāgata from the standpoint of conventional phrases to guide beings.” Translation Braarvig 1993:II.454. According to MSAVBh *tsi* D163a1/P191b2, words like “designation” (*\*prajñapti*), “mere word” (*tshig tsam* = *vacanamātra*?), “mere conventional expression” (*\*vyavahāramātra*) and “mere name” (*\*nāmamātra*) on the one side, and “existing as a [real] substance” (*\*dravyasat*), “existing as a [real] nature” (*rañ bzin yod* = *svabhāvasat*?) and “existing ultimately” (*\*paramārthasat*) on the other side are synonymous (*\*ekārtha*). The *pudgala* exists as a mere verbal designation, as a noun and a conventional expression only. To be compared with AKBh 461,14–17/LE 38,1–5: *yat tarhi vātsīputrīyāḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti / vicāryaṃ tāvad etat / kiṃ te dravyata icchanty āhosvit prajñaptitaḥ / kiṃ cedam dravyata iti kiṃ vā prajñaptitaḥ / rūpādivad bhāvāntaram ced dravyataḥ / kṣīrādivat samudāyaś cet prajñaptitaḥ* /. Yaśomitra adduces other classical examples of *prajñaptisat* (pseudo-)entities (AKVy 699,12–14): *yathā kṣīragrhasenādikaṃ rūparasagandhaspraṣṭavyebhyaḥ tṛṇakāṣ-ṭheṣṭikādibhyo hastyasvarathādibhyaś ca na bhāvāntaram iṣyate* /. On the (partly parallel) distinction between *saṃvṛtisat* and *paramārthasat*, see AK 6.4, AKBh 333,23–334,13 and *Kośa* IV.139–142; see also Katsura 1976.
- 55 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D163a7–b1/P192a2–3, the *Pudgalavādin* now objects as follows: Either you adopt (*\*√grah-*) the thesis (*\*pakṣa*, *\*aṃśa*) that the *pudgala* exists (but you don’t say that it exists), or you adopt the thesis that the *pudgala* does not exist (but you don’t say that it doesn’t exist). Why do you say that it exists as a mere verbal designation and that it does not exist as a real substance? Why don’t you hold an unconditional position (*\*ekāṃśavāda*)?
- 56 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D163b5–7/P192a8–b2, there are two means of valid cognition (*\*pramāṇa*) establishing (*\*√sādh-*) that entities (*\*vastu*) exist as real substances (*\*dravyasat*): perception (*\*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and inference (*\*anumānapramāṇa*). And insofar as objects like visible things (*\*rūpa*), etc., up to mental events (*\*dharma*), exist, they are per-

consists in] a cognition by the intellect (*buddhi*).<sup>58</sup> Now, it is not the case that [we] Pudgalavādins do not cognize the *pudgala* through the intellect. Moreover, the Blessed One has said: “In this very life, [the living being] perceives an *ātman*, designates [an *ātman*].”<sup>59</sup> How then [can the *pudgala* be said] not [to be] perceived? [Answer:] It is not the case that, when it is perceived in this way, the

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ceived (*\*upa\labh-*) by the sense-faculties (*\*indriya*), the direct perceptual awarenesses (*\*vijñāna*), etc. But no sense-faculty or direct perceptual awareness cognizes the *pudgala*. Therefore, since it is not grasped by perception, it does not exist as a real substance. Here, Sthiramati refers to the classification of *dharma*s into 18 sensory elements (*dhātu*; 6 *viśayas*, 6 *indriyas*, 6 *vijñānas*). See AK 1.14ab, AKBh 10,10–11 and *Kośa* I.27. To be compared with AKBh 461,6–8 and 14–15/LE 36,3–6 and 12 (*Kośa* V.231–232): *pratyakṣānumānā-bhāvāt / ye hi dharmāḥ santi teṣāṃ pratyakṣam upalabdhir bhavaty asaty antarāye / tadyathā ṣaṇṇāṃ viśayāṇāṃ manasaś ca / anumānaṃ ca / tadyathā pañcānāṃ indriyāṇāṃ / [...] na caivam ātmano 'stīti nāsty ātmā /*.

57 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D163b7–164a1/P192b3 (*\*pudgalavādin*). That this is an objection is also testified to by Vairocanarakṣita's (MS 42b2) gloss: *upalabdhir ityādi codyam /*.

58 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D164a1–4/P192b3–7, one cannot claim that only (*\*kevalam*) that which is cognized (*\*\dṛś-*) by the (corporeal) sense-faculties exists as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), for there are things existing as real substances which, though they are not perceived by the (corporeal) sense-faculties, are cognized by the intellect (*\*buddhi*), like thought and the mental factors (*\*cittacaitta*). Therefore, “perceived” (*\*upalabdha*) can also refer to things that are grasped by mental awareness (*\*manovijñāna*). According to the Pudgalavādin, then, insofar as the *pudgala* is made perceptible (*\*pratyakṣīkṛta*) by the intellect, it is grasped by perception (*\*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and therefore exists as a real substance. I haven't succeeded so far in locating any clear-cut Pudgalavādin statement to the effect that the *pudgala* is grasped by mental awareness alone (the SŚ remains silent on this important issue). According to the Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya of AK 9 (AKBh 463,11–14/LE 52,2–7, *Kośa* V.238), the *pudgala* is grasped by all the six *vijñānas*, but in an indirect manner: *ṣaḍbhir apīty ucyate / kathaṃ kṛtvā / cakṣurvijñeyāni ced rūpāṇi pratītya pudgalaṃ prativibhāvayati cakṣurvijñeyaḥ pudgalo vaktavyaḥ / no tu vaktavyo rūpāṇi vā no vā / evaṃ yāvan manovijñeyān ced dharmān pratītya pudgalaṃ prativibhāvayati / manovijñeyaḥ pudgalo vaktavyo no tu vaktavyo dharmā vā no vā /* (Yaśomitra [AKVy 701,8] explains *prativibhāvayati* as: *upalakṣayati tadupādānatvāt*, i.e., “one distinguishes [it] in a secondary way, because [the *pudgala*] has these [things] for its basis”). On the *manovijñāna*, see *Kośa* V.242–243n. 3 and, in the context of the perceptibility of the *pudgala*, AKBh 467,1–2/LE80,2–3 (*Kośa* V.252) and AKBh 463,10ff./LE52,1ff. (*Kośa* V.238ff). See also *Traité* II.735–736 and n. 1.

59 Unidentified (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:94–95).

[*pudgala*] is perceived as a [real] substance.<sup>60</sup> [The Pudgalavādin:] For which reason? [Answer:] *Because [the pseudo-perception of the pudgala] is [nothing but] a wrong notion (viparyāsa) [MSA 18.92c<sup>2</sup>].*<sup>61</sup> Indeed, the Blessed One has said that to [take] the selfless as a self is a wrong notion. Therefore, to grasp a *pudgala* in this way is [nothing but] a wrong notion. [The Pudgalavādin:] How is it known that [to grasp a *pudgala* is a wrong notion]? [Answer:] *Because it is a pollution (saṃkleśa) [MSA 18.92d<sup>1</sup>].*<sup>62</sup> Indeed, this pollution is characterized as [that] defilement [which consists in] the personalistic [false] view, i.e., [that which expresses itself in the form] of “I” [and] “mine.”<sup>63</sup> <sup>64</sup>Now, that which is not a wrong notion (*aviparyāsa*) cannot be a pollution.<sup>65</sup> [The Pudgalavādin:] And how can one know that this very [false view] is a pollution? [Answer:] *Because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled*

60 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b1–2/P193a5–7, the scriptural *locus* advocated by the Pudgalavādin has not been preached by the Blessed One with a view (*\*abhiprāya*) to affirm that the *pudgala* exists as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), but rather with a view to affirm that living beings (*\*sattva*) speak erroneously (*phyin ci log tu smra ba*) when they claim to see (*\*√dṛś-*) and to perceive (*\*upa√labh-*) the self (*\*ātman*) in spite of there being no self.

61 Wrong notions are traditionally held to be four in number: permanent (*nitya*), pleasurable (*sukha*), pure/good (*śuci/śubha*), self (*ātman*). AKBh 283,5–7 (*Kośa* IV.21): *catvāro viparyāśāḥ / anitye nityam iti / duḥkhe sukham iti / āsūcau śucīti / anātmāny ātmeti* /. “[There are] four wrong notions: to take what is impermanent as permanent; to take what is painful as pleasurable; to take what is impure as pure; to take what is selfless as a self.” On the four *viparyāsas*, see e.g. *Traité* II.925n. 1, Lévi 1911:237n. 1, May 1959:190–205.

62 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b4–5/P193b1–2, pollution is sixfold: desire (*\*rāga*), hostility (*khon khro ba = pratigha?*), (self-)conceit (*na rgyal = (asmi)māna?*), nescience (*\*avidyā*), false view (*\*dṛṣṭi*), and doubt (*\*saṃśaya*). I am not aware of any other occurrence of this sixfold list. On the meaning of *saṃkleśa*, see Schmithausen 1987:II.246–247n. 21 and May 1959:97–98n. 226.

63 On the *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, see *Kośa* V.15–17, *Traité* II.737n. 3 and Eltschinger forthcoming 1.

64 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b6/P193b3–4, the Pudgalavādin now objects as follows: The false view of the *pudgala* (*\*pudgaladṛṣṭi*) may well have the character of a pollution (*\*saṃkleśalakṣaṇa*), still it does not have the character of a wrong notion (*\*viparyāsalakṣaṇa*).

65 According to MSAVBh tsi D164b7–165a1/P193b4–7, all that which is pollution (*\*saṃkleśa*) is wrong notion (*\*viparyāsa*), as to grasp (*\*grahaṇa*) something as permanent (*\*nitya*) or good (*\*śubha*), and nothing non-polluted is a wrong notion, as to grasp something as impermanent (*\*anitya*) or offensive (*\*aśubha*). Therefore, if to grasp something as the self (*\*ātman*) or the *pudgala* has the character of pollution (*\*saṃkleśalakṣaṇa*), it must be a wrong notion.



(kliṣṭa) [MSA 18.92d<sup>2</sup>].<sup>66</sup> [It is] indeed with this [personalistic false view] as a cause [that] desire, etc., [which are] defiled, are produced.

[The Pudgalavādin:] But [according to you,] should one say that the *pudgala* is one [and the same] with or rather distinct (*anya*) from the [real] thing (*vastu*) named “corporeity,” etc., with regard to which the [verbal] designation “*pudgala*” [takes place]? [The MSA] answers:<sup>67</sup> *This [pudgala] can be said to be neither one [and the same] with nor distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five skandhas] [MSA 18.93ab<sup>1</sup>].*<sup>68</sup> [The Pudgalavādin:] For which reason? [Answer:] *Because of the two faults [that would ensue] [MSA 18.93b<sup>2</sup>].* [The Pudgalavādin:] Because of which two faults? [Answer:] *Because [if the*

66 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a3–4/P194a1–2, defilements (*\*kleśa*) such as desire (*\*rāga*), hostility (*\*dveṣa*) and error (*\*moha*) arise from the false view of a self (*\*ātmadṛṣṭi*). Therefore, since the false view of a self serves as the cause of defilements, the personalistic false view (*\*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) is the nature of the defilements (*\*kleśasvabhāva*). On the genealogy of the defilements out of the false view of a self, see below, MSABh 160,3–4 and n. 123. For similar statements in early Yogācāra literature and in the Buddhist epistemologists’ works, see Eltschinger forthcoming 1.

67 According to MSAVBh tsi D165a4–b2/P194a2–b1, the Pudgalavādin has objected as follows: You claim that the *pudgala* does not exist as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), but exists as a designation (*\*prajñaptisat*). Now, a designation (*\*prajñapti*) is impossible (*\*asambhava*) without a basis (*gī* = *\*vastu*), as the designation “pot” (*\*ghaṭa iti*) is impossible in the absence of a pot, but occurs in dependence of a pot (*\*ghaṭam āśṛitya*). On which basis, then, does the designation “*pudgala*” occur? The reply to this objection is as follows: The designation “*pudgala*,” far from being based on something existing substantially, is nothing but a designation of the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (*\*pañcopādānaskandha*), as it is said in the Sūtra: “O monks, those ascetics or Brahmins who consider that [there is] a self, all these only consider the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings.”\* MSAVBh tsi D165a6/P194a4–5: *dge sbyon nam bram ze 'am / gan su yan run ba bdag gam bdag gi zes 'dogs pa de dag ni ne bar len pa'i phun po lna nid la na 'am bdag gi zes lta zin 'dogs par zad do zes gsun so //*. To be compared with AKBh 282,1–3 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95; *Kośa* IV.17) and AKBh 467,6–7/LE82,2–4 (*Kośa* V.253; see LE82n. 289 for references): *ye kecid bhikṣavaḥ śramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā ātmeti samanupaśyantaḥ samanupaśyanti sarve ta imān eva pañcopādānaskandhān iti /*, and SN III.46 (XXII, 47, 3) (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:95): *ye hi keci bhikkhave samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavihiṭaṃ attānaṃ samanupassamānā samanupassanti / sabbe te pañcupādānakkhandhe samanupassanti etesaṃ vā aññataraṃ /*. The same passage is quoted in MAV 244,15–18 and 254,14–16.

68 According to MSAVBh tsi D165b2–3/P194b1–3, since it exists as a mere designation (*\*prajñaptisat*) but not as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), the *pudgala* can be said neither to be of the same nature (*\*ekasvabhāva*) as the *skandhas* nor to be distinct from the *skandhas*.

skandhas and the pudgala were one and the same,] the skandhas would be (prasaṅga) the self, and [if the skandhas and the pudgala were distinct,] the [pudgala] would be a [real] substance [MSA 18.93cd].<sup>69</sup> For if [the skandhas and the pudgala] are one [and the same], it follows that the skandhas are the self, and that the pudgala is a [real] substance. But if [the skandhas and the pudgala] are distinct[, then it follows that] the pudgala exists as a [real] substance. For [it is] in this way [only, i.e.], since the pudgala exists as a [mere] designation, [that] one is justified [in saying] that it cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas<sup>70</sup>]; [and] therefore, it is established as a point [to be left] unanswered (*avyākṛtavastu*).<sup>71</sup>

69 According to MSAVBh tsi D165b5–166a2/P194b6–195a3, if one holds that the skandhas and the pudgala are one and the same (*\*eka*), then, (1a) as the self (*\*ātman*) is of a permanent nature (*\*nityasvabhāva*), the five skandhas themselves will be of a permanent nature (which is false). Moreover, (1b) if the five skandhas and the self were one and the same, then, as the five skandhas exist as real substances (*\*dravyasat*), the pudgala also would exist as a real substance (which is false). But if one holds the pudgala to exist independently of the five skandhas, then, (2) as the outsiders (*\*tīrthika*) claim that what they call “*ātman*” exists as a real substance independently of the skandhas, what is called “pudgala” will also exist as a real substance independently of the five skandhas (which is false). In both Vasubandhu’s and Sthiramati’s interpretations, (1b) = (2). For an argument similar to (1b), see AKBh 461,24–462,24/LE40,9–48,5, quoted below, n. 76.

70 MSAVBh tsi D166a2–3/P195a3–5: *goñ du bśad pa ltar na gañ zag rdzas su med par ‘gyur te / btags pa tsam du yod pas na / gañ zag gi phuñ po dañ rañ bžin gcig par mi* (em.: DP om. *mi*) ‘gyur ro // phuñ po ñid gañ zag gi rañ bžin yin no źes kyañ ma brjod la / phuñ po la ma gtogs par gañ zag logs śig na yod par yañ mi brjod la / don du na phuñ po la yañ gañ zag gi rañ bžin med / phuñ po la ma gtogs par gañ zag ces bya ba logs śig na yañ rdzas su med do źes bya ba’i don to //. “As stated before, since the pudgala does not exist as a [real] substance, [but] exists as a mere designation, the pudgala cannot have the same nature as the skandhas. [We] don’t say that the skandhas are the nature of the pudgala, and we don’t say that the pudgala exists independently of the skandhas. Ultimately, the skandhas don’t have the nature of a pudgala, [but] the pudgala does not exist as a [real] substance independently of the skandhas. Such is the [intended] meaning.”

71 According to MSAVBh tsi D166a4–6/P195a6–8, one says neither that the skandhas and the pudgala are one and the same thing, nor that they are distinct things. Therefore, if someone asks whether the skandhas and the pudgala are one and the same, one does not answer that they are one and the same thing (*\*eka ity avyākṛta*). And if someone asks whether the skandhas and the pudgala are distinct things, one does not answer that they are distinct things (*\*bhinna ity avyākṛta*). And indeed, since the pudgala is without a nature of its own (*\*niḥsvabhāva*), it can be taught neither to be the same as the skandhas nor to be distinct from them, as it cannot be answered that the son of a barren woman (*\*vandhyāputra*) is of dark (*\*śyāma*) or clear (*\*gaura*) complexion. The types of questions are traditionally held to

be four in number (AKBh 292,9–10): *sthāpanīyaḥ praśno 'vyākṛta ity uktam / caturvidho hi praśnaḥ / ekāṃśavyākaraṇīyo vibhajyavyākaraṇīyaḥ paripṛcchavyākaraṇīyaḥ sthāpanīyaś ca /*. “A question that should be avoided is called ‘unanswered.’ There are indeed four types of questions: to be answered by absolute affirmation, to be answered by distinguishing [the different aspects involved], to be answered by questioning [the questioner], and to be avoided [i.e., left unanswered].” (1) AKBh 292,15: *kiṃ sarvasattvā maraṇtīty ekāṃśena vyākartavyaṃ mariṣyantīti /*. “[The question:] ‘Will all living beings die?’ should be answered by absolute affirmation: ‘[Yes, all] will die.’” (2) AKBh 292,15–16: *kiṃ sarve janiṣyanta iti vibhajya vyākartavyaṃ sakleśā janiṣyante na niḥkleśā iti /*. “[The question:] ‘Will all [living beings] be reborn?’ should be answered by distinguishing: ‘[Those] who are defiled will be reborn, not the undefiled [ones].’” (3) AKBh 292,16–19: *kiṃ manuṣyo viśiṣṭo hīna iti paripṛcchya vyākartavyam / kān adhikṛtya praśnayasīti / yadi brūyād devān iti / hīna iti vyākartavyam / yadi brūyād apāyān iti / viśiṣṭa iti vyākartavyam /*. “[The question:] ‘Is the human being superior [or] inferior?’ should be answered by questioning [the questioner]: ‘With regard to whom do you ask?’ If he said: ‘To the gods,’ [then] one should answer: ‘Inferior.’ [But] if he said: ‘To [those of] the evil states of existence,’ [then] one should answer: ‘Superior.’” (4) The issue of the *pudgala* as well as all the other *avyākṛta-vastus* belongs to the fourth category (AKBh 292,19–20): *kim anyāḥ skandhebhyaḥ sattvo 'nanya iti sthāpanīyaḥ / sattvadravyasyābhāvād vandhyāputraśyāmagauratādivat /*. “[The question:] ‘Is the [personal] being other or the same as the *skandhas*?’ should be avoided, because there is no [such real] substance [as] a [personal] being, as [should be avoided the question] whether the son of a barren woman is of dark or clear complexion.” Other famous examples include: “Is the hair of a tortoise hard or soft?” (*kiṃ kaurmasya romṇaḥ kharatā mṛdutā vā* [AKBh 469,12/LE98,5]), or: “The fruits of the mango tree in your palace, are they sour or sweet? – [But, says king Milinda,] there is no mango tree in my palace!” (*yas te 'ntaḥpure āmravṛkṣas tasya kim amlāni phalāny āhosvin madhurāṇīti / naiva mamāntaḥpure kaścid āmravṛkṣo 'sti /* [AKBh 469,20–21/LE100,3–4]). The reason why the Buddha remains silent on questions such as that of the identity/difference of the self and the *skandhas* is that he takes into consideration the intention of the person asking the question (*praśtur āśayāpekṣā*) in order to prevent him from falling into the extremes of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*, if he answers that they are indeed different) and annihilationism (*ucchedānta*, if he answers that they are the same), i.e., in false views (*dṛṣṭi*) and ethical nihilism (the view that there is no good or bad action and no eschatological consequence), the latter being generally held to be more perverse than the former. On the ten or fourteen *avyākṛtavastus*, see AKBh 292,8–294,4 and *Kośa* IV.43–48, *Traité* I.153–161 and 423; for other references, see May 1959:277–278n. 1015. In the specific context of the present polemic, see especially AKBh 469,9–471,19/LE98,1–114,3 (*Kośa* V.262–270), MAV 250,16–252,2 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:168 and 175–176.

<sup>72</sup>But to those who, violating the Teacher's Teaching, admit that the *pudgala* exists as a [real] substance,<sup>73</sup> one should reply as follows: *If [your pudgala] exists as a [real] substance and [at the same time] cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the skandhas, then you] have to state the reason (prayojana) [for this] [MSA 18.94ab].*<sup>74</sup> [The Pudgalavādin:] Why [should we state such a reason]? [Answer:] *[Because a real pudgala] cannot be said to be neither one [and the same with] nor distinct [from the skandhas] without a reason [being provided for the denial of each of the two propositions] [MSA 18.94cd].*<sup>75</sup>

But if [, in the absence of any reason,] it were merely due to an example that they accepted that the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either one and the same with or distinct from the *skandhas*, stating:] “As fire can be said to be neither distinct

72 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D166a6–7/P195a8–b2, MSABh 155,19–156,8 has been criticizing in a general way (*\*sāmānyena*) both the *\*ātmavādin* outsiders (*\*tīrthika*) and the *\*bauddhas* who believe in the existence of the *pudgala*. In MSABh 156,8–24 (see below, n. 83) onwards, the MSABh starts to criticize the Buddhist coreligionists (*bstan pa 'di la zugs pa*), more precisely the views of the Sāṃmitīyas (*sam* [P: D *saṃ*] *bi ti pa*) who admit that the *pudgala* exists as a real substance. See above, n. 8.

73 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D166a7–b2/P195b2–5, “those who” refers to the Sāṃmitīyas (*sam* [P: D *saṃ*] *bi ti pa*); “Teacher” refers to the Blessed Buddha (*\*bhagavān buddhaḥ*); “Teaching” refers to the twelve-membered word of the Buddha (*\*dvādaśāṅgapravacana*), i.e., to the doctrine according to which all factors are impermanent (*\*anitya*), painful (*\*duḥkha*), empty (*\*śūnya*), and selfless (*\*anātman*). To “violate” this teaching is tantamount to expounding its meaning (*\*artha*) erroneously by saying that what is called “*pudgala*” exists as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), that it can be said neither to be one and the same with (*\*eka*) nor distinct from (*\*bhinna*) the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality (*\*pañcaskandha*).

74 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D166b2–5/P195b5–196a1, the proponent has stated the reasons (*\*prayojana* = *\*hetu*; in MSABh 156,4–7) why he says neither that the *pudgala* is one and the same with the *skandhas* (for if it were the case, the *skandhas* would be permanent and the *pudgala* would exist as a real substance) nor that it is distinct from them (for if it were the case, the *pudgala* would exist as a real substance as the *\*ātman* postulated by the outsiders [*\*tīrthikaparikalpita*]). In the same way, the Pudgalavādin should state the reasons why his substantially existing *pudgala* cannot be said (*\*avācya*) to be either one and the same with or distinct from the *skandhas*.

75 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D166b7–167a2/P196a4–6, if they cannot be said to be one and the same (*\*eka*) thing, then they must be distinct (*\*bhinna*) things, like fire and water, and if they cannot be said to be distinct things, then they must be one and the same, like fire and fire's heat (*\*agnyausṇya*).

from nor the same as the fuel (*indhana*),”<sup>76</sup> one should reply to them as follows: *Because of [their distinct] characteristics, because of [that which is] observed in the [ordinary] world and because of the [authoritative] treatises [that speak to the contrary], it is not correct [to affirm] that fuel and fire cannot be said [MSA 18.95ac] to be either one [and the same] or distinct [from one another]. For what we call “fire” is [nothing but] the element fire (tejodhātu), [whereas] the fuel [consists of] the remaining [three] elements [i.e., earth, water and wind]. Now since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel.<sup>77</sup> And since*

76 According to MSAVBh tsi D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6, the Pudgalavādin adduces an example of something that exists as a real substance but cannot be said to be either one and the same with or distinct from another. Fire (*\*agni*) and fuel (*\*indhana*) exist as real substances (*\*dravyasat*) but are not distinct things, for once fire has arisen from fuel, they are no longer distinct things; and if they were distinct things, fire could arise even in the absence of fuel; but since one doesn’t observe that fire arises in the absence of fuel, they are not distinct things. Nor are fire and fuel one and the same thing, for fuel is the cause of fire and does not have heat for its nature (*\*uṣṇatāsvabhāva*), whereas fire is the effect of fuel and has heat for its nature; and if they were one and the same thing, then, as one would not burn oneself when touching (*[sam]√sprś-*) fire, one would burn oneself when touching fuel. On the example of fuel and fire, see AKBh 461,24–462,24/LE40,9–48,5 (*Kośa* V.234–237), and especially AKBh 462,1–4/LE42,2–6: *na hi vinendhanenāgniḥ prajñāpyate / na cānya indhanād agniḥ śakyate pratijñātum / nāpy anyanyaḥ / yadi hy anyāḥ syād anuṣṇam indhanaṃ syāt / athānanyaḥ syād dāhyam eva dāhakaṃ syāt / evaṃ na ca vinā skandhaiḥ pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate / na cānyaḥ skandhebhyaḥ śakyate pratijñātum śāśvataprasaṅgāt / nāpy anyanya ucchedaprasaṅgād iti /*. Note AKVy 700,7–8: *śāśvataprasaṅgād ity asaṃskṛtavat / ucchedaprasaṅgād iti skandhavat /*. See also above, n. 69. That the(/certain) Pudgalavādins made use of this analogy is made almost certain by a passage of the SŚ (466b3–6, translation Chau 1987:35 [see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:182]): “Qu’est-ce que le *pudgala*-désigné-par-les-fondements? – Comme le Bouddha l’a dit à Pāpaka: ‘En se fondant sur telles et telles choses composées (*saṃskāra*), on nomme [*pudgala*] ce-qui-est-désigné-par-les-fondements.’ Ce qui est nommé [*pudgala*]-désigné-par-les-fondements, est comme le feu [par rapport au combustible].” On the *\*āśrayaprajñāptapudgala*, see 1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique, 1.4. On the fire-fuel analogy, see Duerlinger 1982.

77 According to MSAVBh tsi D167b5–6/P197a3–5, among the four great elements (*\*mahābhūta*), fire is the element fire (*\*tejodhātu*) and has heat for its characteristic (*\*uṣṇatālakṣaṇa*); as for fuel, it consists of the remaining three elements, viz. earth (*\*pṛthivīdhātu*), water (*\*abdhātu*) and wind (*\*vāyudhātu*), which have respectively for their characteristics solidity (*\*kharalakṣaṇa*), fluidity (*\*snehalakṣaṇa*) and mobility (*\*īraṇālakṣaṇa*). See AK 1.12cd, AKBh 8,18–25, and *Kośa* I.22–23. To be compared with AKBh 462,12–14/LE44,11–13 (*Kośa* V.235): *atha punas tatraiva kāṣṭhādaḥ pradīptē yad auṣṇyaṃ tad agnis tatsahajātāni bhūtānīndhanam iṣyante / tayor api siddham anyatvaṃ lakṣaṇabhedāt /*, and AKVy 700,21–24 thereon: *tayor apy agnīndhanayor evalakṣaṇayoḥ siddham anyatvaṃ*

in the world [of ordinary experience], one observes [the existence of] fuel such as wood even in the absence of fire, and [of] fire even in the absence of fuel, [their] being other is [well] established.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, in the [authoritative] treatises (*śāstre*) [preached by Him], the Blessed One has said nowhere that fire and fuel cannot be said [to be either one and the same or distinct].<sup>79</sup> Therefore, this is incorrect. [The Puḍgalavādin:] But how is it known that fire [also] exists without fuel? [Answer:] *Because one perceives [that fire can exist without fuel]* [MSA 18.95d<sup>1</sup>],<sup>80</sup> for [when it is] blown by the wind, [fire can] even go a long way while [still] ablaze. [The Puḍgalavādin:] But in this case, the wind [itself] might [well] be the fuel! [Answer:] This is precisely the reason why it is established that fire and fuel are [mutually] distinct [things]!<sup>81</sup> [The Puḍgalavādin:] But why? [Answer:] *As [being] two, indeed* [MSA 18.95d<sup>2</sup>].<sup>82</sup> [This] is to be construed with “Because one perceives.” [And] indeed, here two [things] are perceived, [i.e.,] the flame and, as [its] fuel, the wind.

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*lakṣaṇabhedāt / pṛthivīdhātuvādinām lakṣaṇānyatvāt / bhinnalakṣaṇānām hy anyatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ rūpavedanādinām /.*

78 On the existence of fire in the absence of fuel, see below, MSABh 156,20–21.

79 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D168a2–4/P196b2–4, in the Abhidharma (*mñon pa'i chos 'bum gyi gzuñ* = \**Abhidharmaśāstasāhasrikagrantha*?), the Blessed One has not said that fire and fuel are one and the same thing, but that they are distinct things, for he has said: “Fire has heat for its nature (\**uṣṇatāsvabhāva*), earth has solidity for its nature (\**kharasvabhāva*), water has fluidity for its nature (\**snehasvabhāva*), and wind has mobility for its nature (\**īraṇāsvabhāva*).”

80 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D167b2–4/P196b7–197a3, *upalabdheḥ* adduces a fourth reason proving that fire and fuel are distinct things. According to Sthiramati, *upalabdhi* is to be understood as \**upalabdhipramāṇa*.

81 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D168b1–2/P198a2–3, since the wind performs the action (\**karman*) of bringing the flame (\**jvālā*) somewhere else (\**anyadeśa*), it has mobility for its nature (\**īraṇāsvabhāva*); but since the flame has heat for its nature (\**uṣṇatāsvabhāva*), wind and fire are established as mutually distinct things.

82 Like Vasubandhu, Sthiramati (MSAVBh *tsi* D168b2–3/P198a3–5) seems to interpret *dvayena hi* as a fifth reason in favour of the difference between fire and fuel, for “*dvayena hi* occurs in the stanza, but not the word *upalabheḥ*” (*kā ri kā las gñis su zes 'byuñ gi / dmigs pa zes bya ba ni tshig mi 'byuñ mod kyī*, MSAVBh *tsi* D168b2–3/P198a4). When the flame is blown by the wind, one perceives them as being two: the wind is perceived as having mobility/motion for its characteristic, whereas the flame is perceived as having heat for its characteristics.

[The Pudgalavādin:] The *pudgala*, which is the seer, [and this] up to the cognizer, the agent, the experiencer, the knower and the liberator, does simply exist.<sup>83</sup> [Answer:] The [*pudgala*] is no more justified as [being] a seer than it is [as the agent of any action,] up to [being] a liberator. [And] indeed, it could be the agent of the cognitions called “seeing,” etc., either as [their causal] condition or as [their] master.<sup>84</sup> Among these [two, let us consider] first [the hypothesis of the *pudgala* as a causal condition]: *Since a cognition arises in dependence of two [factors only], the [pudgala] is not [its causal] condition* [MSA 18.96ab].<sup>85</sup> [The

83 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D168b4–7/P198a5–b2, the false view (*\*dṛṣṭi*) of the Sāṃmitīyas (*sam* [P: D *saṃ*] *bi ti pa*) has been duly refuted (in MSABh 156,8–24, see above, n. 72) so that the MSABh 156,24ff. can turn to the refutation of those outsiders (*\*tūthika*) who hold that the self (*\*ñā'i bdag*, “the self that is the I/ego”) exists. According to them, the self is the agent (*\*kāra*) of the action (*\*kriyā*) of seeing visible things (*\*rūpa*), etc., up to cognizing mental events (*\*dharma*); it experiences (*\*anu/bhū*) the pleasurable (*\*sukha*) and painful (*\*duḥkha*) results (*\*kārya*) of good and bad deeds (*\*kuśalākuśalakarman*) that are responsible for one’s entanglement in *saṃsāra*; the bondage (*\*chīn ba = bandhana, saṃyojana*?) that ties living beings (*\*sattva*) amounts to three factors: *\*sattva*, *\*rajas*, and *\*tamas*; once it has liberated itself from this threefold bondage, the self liberates itself (*\*mokṣa*), obtains *nirvāṇa*. Considering that Sthiramati refers here at least *inter alia* to Sāṃkhya doctrines, Tib. *'chīn ba* may render an original Skt. *bandha* (see Frauwallner 1953:338); pre-classical Sāṃkhya knew of a threefold bondage: *prakṛtibandha* (bondage through *Urmaterie*) *vai-kārikabandha* (bondage through emotions), and *daśiṇābandha* (bondage through the sacrificial fee; see Frauwallner 1953:337–339). In the doctrine alluded to by Sthiramati, the three basic constituents of matter have been substituted for the older three factors, so that one may interpret this threefold bondage as the soul’s entanglement in matter and its processes (see Frauwallner 1953:374–380). As suggested above (see 1. Buddhist Personalism and its Critique, 1.4 and n. 18), there is no compelling reason to follow Sthiramati’s opinion that the MSA(Bh) is now attacking non-Buddhist doctrines.

84 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D168b7–169a5/P198b3–199a1, the self could be an agent in the sense of a master (*\*svāmin*): In the same way as a master or a lord (*dpon po = pati*?) commands (*\*√vaś-*) the slave (*\*dāsa*) and has his wishes fulfilled by the slave due to his command (*\*vaśa*), the self might be in command of cognitions such as the visual cognition (*\*cakṣurvijñānādivijñāna*); due to the power of the self, the cognitions (*\*vijñāna*) would see visible things, etc. (*\*rūpādi*), and the self in turn would see (*\*√dṛś-*) or experience (*\*anu/bhū-*) visible things as they appear in the cognition (*\*yathā vijñāne [prati]bhāṣate*).

85 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D169a5–6/P199a1–3, a visual cognition (*\*cakṣurvijñāna*) arises in dependence of something visible (*\*rūpa*) and the visual sense-faculty (*\*cakṣurindriya*). Therefore, what is called the self cannot act as a causal condition in the rise of a visual cognition. To be compared with AKBh 464,12–14/LE 60,6–9 (*Kośa* V.241): *sūtre hi nirdhāritam / dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpādo bhavati*\* / *tathā cakṣur bhikṣo hetu rūpāṇi pratyayaś cakṣurvijñānasyotpādāya / tat kasya hetoḥ / yat kiṃcid bhikṣo cakṣurvijñānaṃ*

Pudgalavādin:] For which reason [isn't the *pudgala* a causal condition in the production of a cognition]? [Answer:] *Because [it is] useless* [MSA 18.96c<sup>1</sup>], for one does not observe it to have any function (*sāmarthyā*) in this [process].<sup>86</sup> *Or, if [the pudgala] presided over [the rise of a cognition], neither would it bring about an impermanent [pleasurable cognition, nor would it ever bring about] an undesirable one* [MSA 18.97ab].<sup>87</sup> Indeed, if this [*pudgala*] presided over the production of cognitions, it would [certainly] not bring about a desirable [but] impermanent cognition, and certainly no undesirable one. Therefore, since it is impossible in either of the two ways (*ubhayathāpi*) [i.e., either as a causal condition or as a master], *the [pudgala] cannot be a seer, [and this] up to a liberator* [MSA 18.96c<sup>2</sup>d].

Furthermore, if the *pudgala* exists as a [real] substance, *its operation and characteristic are to be established* [MSA 18.97a].<sup>88</sup> [And indeed,] one perceives

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*sarvaṃ tac cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi ceti* \*\* /. \*T 2, 54a23, SN IV.67 (XXXV, 93, 2) according to LE60n. 124; \*\*T 2, 57c18 according to LE60n. 125.

- 86 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D169a5–6/P199a1–3, when fire has been brought about by the fuel, water is in no way (*\*na kathamcit*) necessary in order to produce it; in the same way, when a visual cognition has arisen in dependence of something visible (*\*rūpa*) and the eye (*\*cakṣus*), the self is in no way necessary in order to produce it. In other words, the self is useless (*\*nirartha*), does not perform any action (*\*akimcitkara*).
- 87 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D169b2–5/P199a6–b3, if the self experienced visible or audible things as they appear in cognition, then, since the living beings (*\*sattva*) always (*\*nityam*) long for pleasure (*\*sukha*) alone and wish never to be associated with suffering (*\*duḥkha*), the self would always produce pleasurable cognitions, and never undesirable (*\*aniṣṭa*) and unpleasurable (*\*asukha*) ones. For if the self were in command of cognitions and experienced pleasure and suffering as they appear in the various cognitions, it would always bring about pleasurable cognitions and never painful ones. To be compared with *Traité* II.743: “Si l’Ātman était autonome (*svatantra*) et actif (*kāraka*), il devrait tout obtenir selon ses désirs. Or il n’obtient pas [toujours] ce qu’il désire, et il subit [souvent] ce qu’il ne désire pas. [...] En outre, tout être déteste la douleur (*duḥkha*); mais quiconque recherche le bonheur (*sukha*), trouve la douleur. C’est pourquoi, nous savons que l’Ātman n’est pas autonome, ni non plus actif.”
- 88 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D169b7–170a2/P199b6–200a1, the visual sense-faculty (*\*cakṣurindriya*) and the visual cognition (*\*cakṣurvijñāna*), which exist as real substances (*\*dravyasat*), possess an operation (*\*karman*) and a characteristic (*\*lakṣaṇa*): their joint operation is to perform the action of seeing visible things; the characteristic of the visual sense-faculty is to manifest something visible (*\*rūpaprāsāda*); the characteristic of the visual cognition is (*\*svabhāva*) to cognize a colour such as blue (*\*nīlādirūpa*). If one accepts that what is called the self also exists as a real substance, one has to exhibit its



[both] the operation and the characteristic of [all] that which exists as a [real] substance. For example, [one perceives that] vision, etc., and the manifestation of visible [things], etc., [are respectively the operation and the characteristic] of the eye, etc.<sup>89</sup> But it is not so in the case of the *pudgala*. Therefore, it does not exist as a [real] substance. And if one accepts this [*pudgala*] as a [real] substance, [then] the Blessed One's *threefold complete awakening gets ruined* [MSA 18.97b],<sup>90</sup> [viz.] the complete awakening [that is extremely] profound, the complete awakening [that is] uncommon, and the complete awakening [that is] supra-mundane.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, if [it is] the *pudgala* [that he] perfectly understands,

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operation and its characteristic, for in their absence, the self is simply similar to a rabbit's horn (*\*śaśaviṣāṇa*) and to the son of a barren woman (*\*vandhyāputra*). On the rabbit's horn, see *Traité* II.738 and Venkata Ramanan 1953:193.

89 Translated from the Tibetan version (MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b3): *gañ žig rdzas su yod pa de'i ni las dan mtshan ñid kyañ dmigs te / dper na mig la sogs pa'i lta ba la sogs pa dan gzugs dad pa la sogs pa lta bu yin na /*. Here is the text as edited by Lévi (L157,10–11), with the variant readings of MSS A (156a6–b1) and B (142b2–4) in brackets: *yadi dravyato 'sti tasya karmāpy upalabhyate (upalabhyeta MS A, upalabhyet [sic] MS B) / yathā cakṣurādīnām darśanādīlakṣaṇam ca rūpaprasādādi (MS A om. lakṣaṇam ca rūpaprasādādi) /*. The reading of the Tibetan version can be reconstructed as follows: *\*yad dravyato 'sti tasya karmalakṣaṇam apy upalabhyate / yathā cakṣurādīnām darśanādi rūpaprasādādi (ca) /*. Such a reading is perfectly consonant with Sthiramati's commentary (see above, n. 88), which reflects a *dvandva* analysis of *\*karmalakṣaṇam*.

90 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D170a4–7/P200a3–7, this argument relies on ŚS (*sā lu ljañ pa'i mdo*) 30,16–19 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:96–97 as well as Schoening 1995:I.237–239 and II.395). MSAVBh *tsi* D170a4–5/P200a4–5: *de la sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das gañ ze na / gañ gis chos thams cad thugs su chud pa'i phyir / sañs rgyas zes bya ste / des (em.: P des dan, D de dan) 'phags pa'i chos kyi sku dan šes rab kyi spyen gyis byañ chub byed pa dan slob pa dan mi slob pa'i (em.: DP pas) chos gzigs so //*. “Among these [things], what does a Blessed Buddha consist of? We call ‘Buddha’ the one who, because he comprehends (*\*avabodha*) all *dharma*s, sees the [three] *dharma*s of that which enlightens, of those [still] undergoing training (*\*śaikṣa*) and of those no [longer] in need of training through the noble *dharma*-body and the eye of insight (*\*prajñācakṣus*).” According to Sthiramati, a Buddha is called ‘Buddha’ because he correctly comprehends the meaning of all *dharma*s as many as there are (*\*yāvadbhāvika*). If the *pudgala* existed, this omniscient (*\*sarvajña*) being would see it; but if he saw the *pudgala*, he could no longer be called a ‘Buddha’ due to comprehending this threefold salvational *dharma*.

91 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D170a7–b5/P200a8–b6, his complete awakening is termed “profound” due to the fact that he comprehends the *\*dharmanairātmya* (a feature that traditionally distinguishes him from the Arhats, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), “uncommon” due to the fact that he comprehends the *\*pudgalanairātmya* (a feature that traditionally distinguishes him from the *ātmavādin* outsiders), and “supra-mundane” due to the fact that

[then] nothing profound [at all] is perfectly understood [by him], and [nothing] that is not common to the outsiders, and nothing [that is] unusual (*amucita*) in the ordinary world (*loka*), for such a grasping is accessible to all ordinary people (*loka*), adhered to by the outsiders, and adapted to/usual in (*ucita*) the long *samsāra*.

Moreover, the *pudgala*, if it is [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a cognizer, might either entail exertion or lack exertion in order to see, etc.<sup>92</sup> Now if it belongs to a [*pudgala*] that entails exertion, this exertion might either be self-arisen, [i.e.,] spontaneous, or have this [*pudgala*] as its [causal] condition. *But its effort in order to see, etc., is not self-arisen, because of all the three [faults that are to be presented below]* [MSA 18.98ab]. And it is precisely because of the three faults that will be presented [below] that [we reject the second hypothesis also, i.e., the *pudgala*'s] *being the [causal] condition of this effort* [MSA 18.98c].<sup>93</sup> [Here in MSA 18.98d, the negation] “*na*” is to be supplied. Now if [the *pudgala*] is lacking exertion, [then] it is established [that this *pudgala* is not an agent. And indeed: if] *seeing, etc., lacks an effort* [MSA 18.98d], i.e., if there is no exertion [on the part] of the *pudgala* in order to see, etc., how [can] this [*pudgala*] be [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a cognizer?

[The Pudgalavādin:] It has been stated [above]: “Because of three faults.” [But] because of which three faults? [Answer:] Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [the exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exer-

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he comprehends both the *\*dharma*- and the *\*pudgalanairātmya* (a feature that traditionally distinguishes him from worldly or ordinary persons [*\*laukika*, but also *\*pṛthagjana* in MSAVBh *tsi* D171a1/P201a3]). Alternatively, his complete awakening is termed “profound” because he knows that the *\*parikalpitasvabhāva* does not exist, “uncommon” because he comprehends the *\*paratantra* (which is devoid of *\*parikalpitadharma*s and *\*parikalpitapudgala*), i.e., that the mind and the mental factors (*\*cittacaitta*) simply exist (*yod pa tsam*), and “supra-mundane” because he comprehends the *\*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*.

92 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D171a3–4/P201a5–7, “exertion” (*\*prayatna*) refers to one’s opening (*\*unmeṣa*, *\*unmīlana*) one’s eyes, etc.

93 At least as far as the soundness of the argument is concerned, MSABh 157,22 *tad°* cannot be taken to refer to *pudgala*, an interpretation shared by the Tibetan translations (MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b8 and MSAVBh *tsi* D171a7/P201b3: *byed pa de’i rkyen* [*can*<sub>MSABh<sub>tib</sub></sub>]). Moreover (and contrary to MSABh 157,19: *tatpratrayayaḥ*), the compound *tadyatnatpratrayaya-* is better not interpreted as a *bahuvrīhi*.

tion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen [MSA 18.99]. If the exertion [made] in order to see [visible things], etc., [and] through which seeing, etc., [occurs,] is spontaneous [i.e., without cause nor condition], then the *pudgala* is not the agent of these [cognitions]; therefore, how [can] this *pudgala* be [an agent such as] a seer, [and this] up to a cognizer? Or, if it is spontaneous, [then,] since it does not depend [on any cause or condition, this] exertion would not occasionally fail to occur, would not be impermanent.<sup>94</sup> And if this effort were permanent, [then] seeing, etc., would occur both [all] at once and permanently.<sup>95</sup> Such is the [threefold] fault [alluded to above]. Therefore, the exertion [made] in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be spontaneous.

*Neither a [pudgala] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [pudgala] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before [, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor impermanent] [MSA 18.100].<sup>96</sup>*

94 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D172a4–5/P202b2–4, since that which depends on a cause (*\*kāraṇam apekṣate*) arises when its cause is present and does not arise when its cause is absent, it can be lacking sometimes; on the contrary, causeless (*\*nirhetuka*) *dharma*s, since they do not depend on causes and conditions (*\*hetupratyaya*), can never be lacking at a certain point in time. Therefore, if it is spontaneous (*\*ākasmika*), the effort made in order to see something visible, etc., should not be impermanent, i.e., should be characterized as permanent (*\*nityalakṣaṇa*).

95 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D172a5–b1/P202b4–7, impermanent *dharma*s do not arise all at once (*\*sakṛt*); some arise and some do not arise; sometimes they arise and sometimes not. On the contrary, permanent *dharma*s occur entirely (*thog thag tu khyab par*), like space (*\*ākāśavat*), and all the time (*\*sarvadā*).

96 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D172b1–7/P202b8–203b1, if the self serves as a causal condition (*\*pratyaya*), then this causal condition could be either permanent or impermanent according to whether the self is permanent or impermanent. (1) Since the effects arisen from permanent causes cannot be occasional but occur permanently, the action of seeing should occur when the eyes actually see (or: when the eyes are opened, *\*cakṣurunmeṣakāle*), but also already before, when they do not see yet (or: when the eyes are shut, *\*cakṣurnimeṣakāle*; see also MSAVBh *tsi* D172b7–173a3/P203b1–3). (2) Since the self must be impermanent if the exertion is impermanent, the opponent's claim that the self is permanent is useless (see also MSAVBh *tsi* D173a6–7/P203b7–204a1). (3) There can be no third hypothesis according to which the self would be neither permanent nor impermanent because, since “permanent” and “impermanent” are contradictory properties (*\*viruddhadharma*), that which is perma-

But if the exertion [made in order to see something visible, etc.,] had the *pudgala* for its [causal] condition, [then] this [*pudgala*, if it always] remains as it is, cannot be the [causal] condition [of this exertion], because [this exertion] does not exist before [the wish to open one's eyes and see]. For if [this effort] had the [*pudgala*] for its [causal] condition, [then,] since the *pudgala* is never without existing, why would [this] exertion lack before, [i.e.,] when it has not [yet] arisen? [But] a perishable [*pudgala*] cannot be the condition [of exertion] either, for it would follow that the *pudgala* is impermanent. And there [can] be no third hypothesis according to which it could be neither enduring nor perishable. [Therefore,] the effort cannot have this [*pudgala*] for its condition either.

So far (*evaṃ tāvat*), [it is] by resorting to reason(ing) [alone that it has been demonstrated that] the *pudgala* does not exist (*nopalabhyate*) as a [real] substance.<sup>97</sup> And [this can also be demonstrated by resorting to scripture,] because [the Blessed One has] taught [that] all *dharma*s are selfless, [that] ultimately [there is nothing but] emptiness, and [that] to perceive a self is harmful (*ātmopalambhe doṣaḥ*) [MSA 18.101]. Indeed, in the [four] summary statements of doctrine,<sup>98</sup> the Blessed One has taught that all *dharma*s are selfless. [And] in the [Sūtra entitled] *Paramārthaśūnyatā*,<sup>99</sup> [the Blessed One has] taught that the act<sup>100</sup> [really] exists, that the [result of its] maturation<sup>101</sup> [also] exists, but that

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nent is not impermanent, and that which is impermanent is not permanent: for one single *dharma* (or: entity, *\*vastu*) cannot be determined (*\*vyavasthita*) as being neither permanent nor impermanent. Moreover, if it is not permanent, then it is impermanent (or: one adopts the thesis of impermanence, *\*anityapakṣapāta*), and the first of the above-mentioned faults (see [1]) will ensue; if it is not impermanent, then it is permanent (or: one adopts the thesis of permanence, *\*nityapakṣapāta*), and the second of the above-mentioned faults (see [2]) will ensue (see also MSAVBh *tsi* D173a6–7/P203b7–204a1).

97 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D173b2/P204a4–5, reason(ing) (*\*yukti*) consists of arguments made on the basis of perception (*\*pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and inference (*\*anumānapramāṇa*). In MSABh 158,16ff., our text turns to prove that the *pudgala* does not exist as a real substance by means of scripture (*\*āgamapramāṇa*).

98 On the four *dharmoddānas*, see MSAVBh *tsi* D173b3–4/P204a6–7 and 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.2.

99 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D173b4/P204a7, in the Sūtra of the Śrāvakas entitled *Paramārthaśūnyatā*. See LE92n. 355, which refers to T. 2, 92c18, and the passage quoted in *Kośa* V.259–260n. 5. See below, n. 102.

100 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D173b7/P204b3, the good (*\*kuśala*) and bad (*\*akuśala*) acts (*\*karman*) one has done.

there is no (*nopalabhyate*) agent who [would] leave these *skandhas* [at death] and take up other *skandhas* [at rebirth] except a convention[al designation] for the [dependently originated] *dharmas*.<sup>102</sup> [And] in the *Pañcakas*,<sup>103</sup> [the Blessed

101 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D173b7/P204b3, the pleasurable (*\*sukha*) and painful (*\*duḥkha*) result (*\*phala*) one experiences (*\*anubhūta*).

102 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D173b7–174a2/P204b3–5, *dharmasaṅketa* (rendered *chos su brdar btags pa* in MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b1–2, but *chos kyi tha sñad* in MSAVBh *tsi* D173b7/P204b3 and D174a1/P204b4) refers to (re)birth in saṃsāra according to the twelve-membered scheme/principle (*\*dvādaśāṅganaya*) of dependent origination (*\*pratītyasamutpāda*), i.e., “with nescience for their condition (*\*avidyāpratya*) arise the karmic forces (*\*saṃ-skāra*),” etc., up to “with rebirth as their condition (*\*jātipratya*) arise old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*),” etc. Outside/except for this twelvefold scheme/principle, there is nothing [...]. The same passage is quoted in AKBh 129,9–12 (see also Okada/Kishi 2008:98, AKVy 707,13–16, *Kośa* V.259–260) and AKBh 468,24–26/LE92,8–10, with no variant reading, but with a very useful remark to the effect that, according to Vasubandhu, *dharmasaṅketa* amounts to nothing but dependent origination: *asti karmāsti vipākāḥ kārakas tu nopala-bhyate ya imāṃś ca skandhān niṣipaty anyāṃś ca skandhān pratisandadhāty anyatra dharmasaṅketāt / tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṅketo yad utāsmin satīdam bhavatīti vistareṇa pratītyasamutpādaḥ /* (Note that Yaśomitra explains *imān* by *aihiḥkān*, “this-worldly,” and *anyān* by *pāratrikān*, “other-worldly”). The equivalence between *dharmasaṅketa* and the *pratītyasamutpāda* is strengthened by Yaśomitra’s comments: *saṅketā hetuphalasambandhavyavasthāḥ* (AKVy 283,7), and *dharmasaṅketād iti pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇāḥ* (AKVy 707,16). So according to Sthiramati, *saṅketa*  $\approx$  *naya* (scheme, principle, method, behaviour); according to Yaśomitra, *saṅketa*  $\approx$  (*hetuphalasambandha*)*vyavasthā* (law, rule, status, condition) and *saṅketa*  $\approx$  *lakṣaṇa* (token, attribute, characteristic; the particle *iti* makes it difficult to understand *pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇāt* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound). Should we, then, understand *dharmasaṅketa* as the “convention(al designation) for the (dependently originated) *dharmas*” (as Paramārtha seems to do, see *Kośa* V.260n. 3), as the “(causal) law (governing) the *dharmas*,” or simply as “causal origination of *dharmas*” (as does de La Vallée Poussin, see *Kośa* V.260)? See the passage of the Chinese *Samyuktāgama* quoted in *Kośa* V.259–260n. 5 and de La Vallée Poussin’s comments on *dharmasaṅketa* in *Kośa* V.260n. 3. Candrakīrti quotes a small part of the same passage in MAV 262,1.

103 Both Sthiramati (MSAVBh *tsi* D173b5–7/P204a8–b2: *ñan thos kyi gzuñ gcig las brtsams pa dan / luñ riñ po źes bya ba la sogs pa gzuñ mañ du yod pa las luñ riñ po'i gzuñ gi nañ nas chos gcig las brtsams pa dan / gñis las brtsams pa dan / gsum las brtsams pa dan / bñi las brtsams pa dan / lña las brtsams pa'i char gyi nañ nas* (P: D las) *lña lñas las brtsams pa'i lña phrugs bśad pa'i skabs su / gañ gi phyir bdag tu bltas* (D: P ltas) *na ñes pa rnam pa lña 'byuñ no źes gsuñs te / de bas na gañ zag rdzas su yod pa ma yin no* //) and Vairocanarakṣita (MS 42b4: *ekottarikāgame pañcapañcadharmādhikāreṇa nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ*) refer to the *Ekottarikāgama*, but the passage seems to have resisted all attempts at identification so far. As pointed out by La Vallée Poussin (*Kośa* V.250–251n. 3), however, the passage presents a striking phraseological similarity with AN III.246 (CC, 5, and *passim*, *Pañcakanipāta*

One has] taught that there are five evils in the perception of a self. [First,] the [false] view of a self [and] the [false] view of a soul (*jīva*) arise.<sup>104</sup> [Second, he who indulges in the perception of an *ātman*] is not different from the [substantialist] outsiders. [Third, he] engages himself in a wrong path.<sup>105</sup> [Fourth,] his mind does not penetrate<sup>106</sup> into emptiness, has no faith [in it], is not intent [upon it], is not convinced [of it].<sup>107</sup> [Fifth,] he does not purify his noble factors.<sup>108</sup> From scripture also it is thus incorrect [to claim that the *pudgala* exists as a real substance].

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Section, to be compared with DN III.240 [XXXIII, 2, 1] and SN III.133 [XXII, 90, 5]): *cittaṃ na pakkhandati na ppaṣīdati na santiṭṭhati na vimuccati*. The same passage is quoted in AKBh 466,14–17/LE76,6–9 (see AKVy 704,32–705,2; *Kośa* V.250–251n. 4) with only a few variants: *ātmadr̥ṣṭir bhavati sattvadṛṣṭir jīvadṛṣṭiś ca* for *ātmadr̥ṣṭir bhavati jīvadṛṣṭiḥ*; *tīrthikaiḥ sārddham* for *tīrthikaiḥ*; *na vimucyate* for *nādhimucyate* (note, however, that AKVy 705,1 also reads *nādhimucyate*). Interestingly enough, the Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmatīya of AKBh 466,17–24/LE78,1–12 (*Kośa* V.251–252) does not accept this *locus* as a scriptural authority (*pramāṇa*) on the grounds that “this [passage, *grantha*] is not read/(recited) in our sect” (*nāsmākam ayaṃ nikāye paṭhyate*), that “it is not the word of the Buddha” (*na hi kilaitad buddhavacanam*), and that “it is not the word of the Buddha because we don’t read/(recite) it” (*so ’smābhir apāṭhān na buddhavacanam*).

- 104 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D174a2/P204b5–6, if one accepts that the *pudgala* exists as a real substance (*\*dravyasat*), one will develop the false view of a self and a soul regarding the *skandhas* that are in themselves devoid of self (*\*ātman*) and one’s own (*\*ātmīya*, or: “what belongs to the self”).
- 105 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D174a4–5/P204b8–205a1, the right path is the one that leads to *nirvāṇa* and liberation (*\*mokṣa*) by means of the mental cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*) of the fact that all conditioned factors (*\*saṃskāra*) are impermanent (*\*anitya*), painful (*\*duḥkha*), empty (*\*śūnya*), and selfless (*\*anātman*). As for the wrong path, it is that of rebirth in *saṃsāra* and the evil states of existence (*\*apāya*). On *pratipanna*, see BHSD s.v. *pratipanna*.
- 106 On *praṣkand* (Tib. *’jug pa* in MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b3 and MSAVBh *tsi* D174a5–6/P205a2–3), see BHSD s.v. *praskanda*.
- 107 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D174a5–7/P205a2–4, *śūnyatā* is here to be understood as the absence of self and one’s own (*\*ātmātmīya*). According to Sthiramati, *na prasīdati na saṃtiṣṭhate nādhimucyate* provides an explanation of *na praskandati*: “has no faith [in it]” refers to the time of listening (*\*śrutakāla*, i.e., the *śrutamayī prajñā*), “is not intent [upon it]” refers to the time of (rational) reflection (*\*cintākāla*, i.e., the *cintāmayī prajñā*), and “is not convinced [of it]” refers to the time of mental cultivation (*\*bhāvanākāla*, i.e., the *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). On *prasāda* and *adhimokṣa/adhimukti*, see Schmithausen 1969:179–181nn. 263–264 and BHSD s.v. *prasāda* and *adhimukti*.
- 108 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D174a7–b1/P205a5–6, since he does not rid himself of the defilements (*\*kleśa*) that are to be abandoned by (the path of) vision (*\*darśanaheya*) and by

[The Puḍgalavādin:] But (*hi*) the *puḍgala* has also been taught by the Blessed One in such and such [Sūtras] through the classification of [various sorts of] *puḍgalas* such as the one who knows thoroughly (*parijñātāvin*), the burden-bearer (*bhārahāra*) and the one who follows faith (*śraddhānusārin*). Therefore, if [the *puḍgala*] does not exist as a [real] substance, why [has it been] taught [by the Blessed One]?<sup>109</sup> [Answer:] *Because by [resorting to the designation of] puḍgala, one [can, as did the Blessed One,] indicate differences in addiction and [mental] series concerning defilement and purification, which vary [each] according to degree and party* [MSA 18.102].<sup>110</sup> For in the absence of a designation [such as that] of “*puḍgala*,” one couldn’t, with regard to impurity and purification, [both of] which differ according to degree and party, point to the differences in the addiction to them as well as to the differences in the [mental]

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(the path of) cultivation (*\*bhāvanāheya*) and hence fails to directly realize (*\*sākṣātpṛāpti*) nirvāṇa, he does not purify his noble factors.

- 109 MSAVBh *tsi* D174b2–4/P205a7–b2 also mentions the *dharmānusāripuḍgala*. On the form *parijñātāvin*, see BHSG §22.51; on *śraddhānusārin*, *dharmānusārin* and the classification (*vyavasthāna*, AKBh 353,12) of other types of *puḍgalas* in whose mental series the noble path has arisen (*utpannāryamārga*), see AK 6.29ab and AKBh 353,12–18. See also above, n. 53.
- 110 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D174b4–175b1/P205b2–206a8, if the name (*\*nāma*) and the conventional expression (*\*vyavahāra*) of “*puḍgala*” were not available, the differences pertaining to *saṃkleśa*, *vyavadāna*, *avasthā*, *cheda*, *vṛtti* and *saṃtāna* could not be indicated. The one who is endowed with *dharma*s belonging to pollution (*\*saṃkleśadharmā*) will be called “a *puḍgala* endowed with pollution” (*\*saṃkleśavān puḍgalaḥ*), whereas the one who is endowed with *dharma*s belonging to purification (*\*vyavadānadharma*) will be called “a *puḍgala* endowed with purification” (*\*vyavadānavān puḍgalaḥ*). But pollution and purification entail many (*\*bahu[vi]dhā*) degrees (*\*avasthā*): those abiding in little, moderate or great pollution will be called “*puḍgalas* of little, moderate or great desire (*\*rāga*),” while those abiding in little, moderate or great purification will be called “*puḍgalas* having obtained a little, moderate or great path (*\*mārgapṛāpta*).” Those who engage in bad actions only (*\*ekāntakuśalakarmakārin*) will be called “inclined towards (*\*saṃkleśapakṣapatita*), siding with pollution,” whereas those who engage in good actions only (*\*ekāntakuśalakarmakārin*) will be called “inclined towards (*\*vyavadānapakṣapatita*), siding with purification” (see also Vairocanarakṣita MS 46b5–6: *yaḥ puḍgala ekāntakuśalakārī sa saṃkleśacchedabheda[kā]ḥ / yaś caikāntavyavadānakarmakārī sa vyavadānacchedabhedakāḥ* /). In the same way, those who are addicted to pollution and to purification will respectively be called “*puḍgalas* given up to pollution” and “*puḍgalas* given up to purification.” Or, one may say, concerning those who abide in pollution or purification: “This *puḍgala* has a polluted mental series,” “This *puḍgala* has a purified mental series.” See also MSAVBh *tsi* D175b1–5/P206a8–b5.

series. In this [connection], in the *Parijñāsūtra*, the factors that are to be known are the impurity, [whereas] the knowledge is the purification.<sup>111</sup> In the *Bhārahārasūtra*, the burden and the taking up of the burden [belong to] impurity, [whereas] the laying down of the burden [belongs to] purification.<sup>112</sup> In the ab-

111 According to MSAVBh tsi D175b5–176a2/P206b5–207a2, in the *Parijñāsūtra* (*yoṇs su śes pa'i mdo sde*), the factors that are to be known (*\*parijñeyadharma*) and the knowledge (*\*parijñā*) are twofold each: the truth of suffering (*\*duḥkhasatya*) and the truth of origin (*\*samudayasatya*) are the factors that are to be known; they side with pollution (*kun nas ñon moṇs pa'i phyogs su bsdu = saṃkleśapakṣasaṅgrhīta?*). As for the truth of destruction (*\*nirodhasatya*) and the truth of the path (*\*mārgasatya*), they are the knowledge itself, and side with purification (*rnam par byañ ba'i phyogs su bsdu = vyavadānapakṣasaṅgrhīta?*). In the absence of the designation “*pudgala*,” it would be impossible to indicate the different additions (*\*vṛtti*) and (mental) series (*\*santāna*) of those who are said to be persons who are (still) to be taught the things to be known (*?yoṇs su śes par bya ba'i gaṇ zag*) and persons who know thoroughly (*yoṇs sur śes par byed pa'i gaṇ zag = parijñātāvīpudgala?*). Among them, the persons who are (still) to be taught the things to be known, whose mental series is endowed with *dharma*s belonging to pollution, are engaged on the side of pollution (*kun nas ñon moṇs pa'i phyogs la žugs pa = saṃkleśapakṣappravṛtta?*); as for the person who knows thoroughly, whose mental series is endowed with *dharma*s belonging to purification, he is engaged in the *dharma*s belonging to purification (*\*vyavadānadharmappravṛtta*). On *parijñātāvin*, see above, n. 109. For the Pāli *Pariññāsutta*, see SN III.26 (= no. XXII.23). The *sūtra* begins thus: *pariññeye ca bhikkhave dhamme desissāmi pariññāñca* /. Here, the *parijñeyadharma*s consist of corporeity (*rūpa*), affective sensation (*vedanā*), ideation (*saññā = samjñā*), conditioned factors (*saṅkhāra = saṃskāra*), and direct awareness (*viññāṇa = vijñāna*), whereas *parijñā* consists of the destruction of desire (*rāgakkhaya = rāgaḥṣaya*), the destruction of defilements (*doṣakkhaya = doṣaḥṣaya*) and the destruction of error (*moha-kkhaya = mohaḥṣaya*).

112 According to MSAVBh tsi D176a2–6/P207a2–7, in the *Bhārahārasūtra* (*khur khyer ba'i mdo sde*), the *pudgala* who bears the burden and the *pudgala* who lays down the burden are twofold each. Here, the truth of suffering (*\*duḥkhasatya*) is called the burden (*\*bhāra*), whereas the truth of origin (*\*samudayasatya*) is called either the bearing (*\*bhārahāra*) or the taking up of the burden (*\*bhārādāna*). Both side with pollution. The laying down of the burden (*\*bhāranikṣepa[ṇa]*) is also twofold: when (*\*kadā*) the burden is laid down (*\*nikṣipta*; at the time of destruction, *\*nirodhakāla*), and by means of what (*\*kena*) the burden is laid down (by means of the truth of the path, *\*mārgasatya*). Both side with purification. Those *pudgalas* who haven't yet eliminated (*\*aprahīṇa*) suffering and its origin are said to be engaged (*\*pravṛtta*) in the bearing of the burden and to have a mental series endowed with a burden. Those *pudgalas* who have obtained (*\*prāpta*) the truth of destruction and the truth of the path are said to be engaged in the laying down of the burden and to have a mental series endowed with the laying down of the burden. Note Vairocana-rakṣita's explanation (MS 46b6): *bhāro duḥkhasatyam / bhārādānaṃ samudayasatyam / nikṣepaṇaṃ hānir vyavadānaṃ nirodhamārgasatyam* /. For the Pāli *Bhārasutta*, see SN



sence of the designations of *pudgalas* [such as] the *parijñātāvin* and the *bhārahāra*, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and different [mental] series. [As for the thirty-seven] factors that are aids to awakening, they possess various degrees according to the different paths [in which they are cultivated, viz., those] of preparation, of vision, of cultivation and of culmination; [and] in the absence of the designation of *pudgalas* such as the *śraddhānusārin*, it would be impossible to point to their different addictions and different [mental] series.<sup>113</sup> This is to be known as the reason (*naya*) why the

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III.25–26 (= no. XXII.22). For the Chinese versions of the *Bhārahārasūtra* (T. 2, no. 99 [19a15ff] and 125 [631c11ff]), see Okada/Kishi 2008:101–102, and Frauwallner 2010:16 for a translation). In the Pāli version of the sūtra, the burden consists of the five constituents-of-(pseudo-)personality to which one clings (*pañcupādānakkhandha* = *pañcopādānaskandha*); the taking up of the burden consists of craving (*taṇhā* = *ṭṭṣṇā*); the laying down of the burden consists of cessation (*nirodha*). As for the laying hold of the burden (*bhārahāra*), “it is the person [...], that venerable one of such and such a name, of such and such a family” (*puggalo... yoyaṃ āyasmā evaṃnāmo evaṃgotto*). On the *Bhārahārasūtra*, see also AKBh 468,1–9/LE88,1–14 (*Kośa* V.256–257), and especially the long quotation in AKVy 706,3–12: *bhāraṃ ca vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṃ ca bhāranikṣepaṇaṃ ca bhārahāraṃ ca / tac chṛṇuta sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca manasikuruta bhāṣiṣye / bhāraḥ katamaḥ / pañcopādānaskandhāḥ / bhārādānaṃ katamat / ṭṭṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī / bhāranikṣepaṇaṃ katamat / yad asyā eva ṭṭṣṇāyāḥ paunarbhavikyā nandīgatasahagatāyās tatratatrābhinandinyā aśeṣaprahāṇaṃ pratiniḥsargo vyantībhāvaḥ kṣayo virāgo nirodho vyupaśamo 'staṅgamaḥ / bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ / pudgala iti syād vacanīyam / yo 'sāv āyuṣmān evaṃnāmā evaṃjānya evaṃgotra evamāhāra evaṃsukhaduḥkhaḥpratisaṃvedy evaṃdīrghāyur evaṃcirasthitika evamāyūṣmanta iti /*. Note also AKBh 465,15–16/LE70,1–3: *sa āyuṣmān evaṃnāmā evaṃjātya evaṃgotra evamāhāra evaṃsukhaduḥkhaḥpratisaṃvedy evaṃdīrghāyur evaṃcirasthitika evamāyūḥparyanta iti /*. The proper exegesis of the *Bhārasūtra* is also dealt with in TS 349 and TSP K130,1–21/Ś165,1–19 (see Schayer 1931–1932:88–91). The TSP contains two quotations. (1) TSP K130,1–3/Ś165,1–4: *bhāraṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṃ bhāranikṣepaṃ bhārahāraṃ ca / tatra bhāraḥ pañcopādānaskandhā bhārādānaṃ ṭṭṣṇā bhāranikṣepo mokṣo bhārahāraḥ pudgalā iti /*. (2) TSP K130,15–16/Ś165,12–14: *yo 'sāv āyuṣmann [sic] evaṃnāmā evaṃjātir evaṃgotra evamāhāra evaṃsukhaduḥkhaḥpratisaṃvedy evaṃdīrghāyur iti [...]*. According to Bareau 1955:115, the *Bhārahārasūtra* belonged to the scriptural texts most oft-quoted by the Vātsīputrīyas (see Venkata Ramanan 1953:170–171 and 178–179).

- 113 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D176a7–b6/P207a8–b8, these 37 factors are cultivated by the candidate while abiding in the path of preparation (*\*prayogamārgāvasthāyām*), in the path of vision (*\*darśanamārgāvasthāyām*), in the path of cultivation (*\*bhāvanāmārgāvasthāyām*) and in the path of culmination (*\*niṣṭhāmārgāvasthāyām*). In other words, the degrees of their cultivation (*\*bhāvanāvasthā*) are manifold (*\*bahu[vi]dhā*). Among these paths, the path of preparation refers to the four *\*adhimukticyābhūmis*, and the *pudgala*

Blessed One] has taught the *pudgala* although [it] does not exist as a [real] substance.

Otherwise,<sup>114</sup> the [Blessed One's] teaching of the *pudgala* [would] indeed be pointless.<sup>115</sup> First, it cannot have been aimed at generating the [false] view of a self [in the living beings], because *the view of a self is not to be generated [in the living beings]* [MSA 18.103a], since it has arisen well before.<sup>116</sup> <sup>117</sup>Nor was it aimed at [allowing the living beings to] cultivate this [already existing but not yet cultivated view of a self], for of [this] view of a self, *[their] cultivation is beginningless* [MSA 18.103b]. And if it had been taught because [one achieves]

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who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called an *\*adhimukticāripudgala*. At the time of the *\*darśanamārga*, the bodhisattvas have obtained the first stage (*\*bhūmi*), whereas the śrāvakas have obtained the *\*srotaāpattimārga* (the *srotaāpanna* is the one who has not yet abandoned the *bhāvanāheyakleśas*, AKBh 356,1 and *Kośa* IV.200; for an etymology of *srotaāpanna*, see AKBh 356,4–5 and *Kośa* IV.200) and the *pudgala* who cultivates the 37 factors at that time (*\*tatkāle*) is called a *\*darśanamārgasthapudgala*. According to the method of the Great Vehicle (*\*mahāyānanayena*), the *\*bhāvanāmārga* starts at the second stage, whereas according to the method of the Lesser Vehicle (*\*hīnayānanayena*), it starts at the obtention of the *\*srotaāpattiphala*, and the *pudgala* who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called a *\*bhāvanāmārgasthapudgala*. According to the method of the Great Vehicle, the *\*niṣṭhāmārga* refers to the *\*abhisambodhi*, whereas according to the method of the Lesser Vehicle, it refers to the obtention of the *\*arhat(tva)phala*, and the *pudgala* who cultivates the 37 factors at that time is called *\*āśaikṣapudgala* (on the *arhat* or *āśaikṣa*, see AK 6.45ab, AKBh 365,16–20 and *Kośa* IV.230–231). For an outline of the non-Mahāyānist path, see *Kośa* IV.iv–xi; for an account of the stages in the bodhisattva's career, see Dayal 1970:270–291; on the 37 *bodhipakṣya/bodhipākṣikadharmas*, see 2. The Immediate Context of MSA(Bh) 18.92–103, 2.1 and n. 34.

114 I.e., if there were no rationale behind the Buddha's resorting to this *flatus vocis*.

115 According to MSAVBh tsi D176b7–177a1/P208a2–3, the Pudgalavādin now objects that the Blessed One has taught the *pudgala* in order to generate the view of a self (*\*ātmadrṣṭi*) in the mental series (*\*cittasantāna*) of those living beings (*\*sattva*) in whose mental series the view of a self has not yet arisen (*\*anutpannātmadrṣṭicittasantāna*).

116 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a3–4/P208a6, the false view of a self (*\*ātmadrṣṭi*) is no longer to be generated since it has been present in their mental series (*\*cittasantāna*) since the beginningless time (*\*anādikāla*) of saṃsāra.

117 According to MSAVBh tsi D177a4–5/P208a6–7, the Pudgalavādin now objects that, although the view of a self (*\*ātmadrṣṭi*) has arisen in the mental series (*\*cittasantāna*) of the living beings, these do not cultivate (*\*abhyāsa*) it; the Blessed One has taught the *pudgala* so that these living beings may cultivate the view of a self.

liberation through the vision of the self,<sup>118</sup> then [it would mean that] *all [living beings could] achieve liberation without effort* [MSA 18.103c], for all those who have not [yet] seen the [noble] truths have the [false] view of a self.<sup>119</sup> Or, it results that there is simply *no liberation* [MSA 18.103d<sup>1</sup>]. For no one, having first<sup>120</sup> grasped the self as non-self, [would] grasp [it] as the self when fully comprehending the truth<sup>121</sup> in the same way as [someone] who, having first failed to grasp suffering as suffering, [will] grasp [it as suffering] afterwards.<sup>122</sup> Thus, [since] after [the full comprehension of truth the non-grasping of the self as the self would be exactly the same] as before, there would be no liberation [at all]. And if the *ātman* [really] exists, [then,] due to the notion of “I” and the notion of “mine,” craving for the [pleasure of the] self and [all] the other defilements caused by this [very view of a self] will necessarily arise. For this reason also,

- 118 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D177a6/P208b1–2, although the living beings (*\*sattva*) cultivate the view of a self (*\*ātmadṛṣṭi*) and are only familiar with the self through its name (*\*nāmamātra*), they cannot reach liberation (*\*mokṣa*; *\*apavarga*; *\*nirvāṇa*) because they don’t really see the self, which has the size of a thumb (*\*aṅguṣṭhamātra*) or the size of a mustard-seed (*\*sarṣapamātra*). The Blessed One has taught the *pudgala* so that the living beings, by seeing this tiny self, may achieve liberation. Sthiramati alludes here to Upaniṣadic speculations about the size of the *ātman*: *aṅguṣṭhamātra* in *Katha Upaniṣad* 4.12; *sarṣapa* in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.14.3. For a similar discussion in the context of the polemic against the Pudgalavādin, see *Traité* II.744 and n. 1; on *sarṣapa*, see also Venkata Ramanan 1953:189.
- 119 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D177b2–4/P208b5–7, if one achieves liberation through the view of a self (*\*ātmadṛṣṭi*), then, since ordinary persons (*\*pṛthagjana*) who *per definitionem* have not seen the truths (i.e., have not yet reached the path of vision) are possessed with the view of a self, all living beings (*\*sattva*) would achieve liberation (*\*mokṣa*; *\*nirvāṇa*) without making any effort towards listening (*śruta*, i.e., the *śrutamayī prajñā*), reflection (*cintā*, i.e., the *cintāmayī prajñā*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*, i.e., the *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*).
- 120 I.e., still as an ordinary person, before the full comprehension of truth (*satyābhisamaya*).
- 121 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D177b5–7/P209a1–3, in the religious doctrine (*dharma*) according to which the self exists (*bdag yod pa’i chos*), one does not see the self before engaging in the cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*) process, but rather sees selflessness(/sees that the self does not exist: *bdag med par mthoñ ba*) and does not, therefore, achieve liberation (*\*mokṣa*). But once cultivation has taken place, one sees that the self exists and hence achieves liberation.
- 122 According to MSAVBh *tsi* D177b5–7/P209a1–3, since one does not see the four truths of suffering, etc. (*\*duḥkhādisatyacatuṣṭaya*) before engaging in listening (*śruta*, i.e., the *śrutamayī prajñā*), reflection (*cintā*, i.e., the *cintāmayī prajñā*) and cultivation (*bhāvanā*, i.e., the *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*), one does not achieve liberation (*\*mokṣa*), but after these have taken place, one sees the four truths and achieves liberation.

there would be no liberation [at all].<sup>123</sup> One should *rather not* (na vā) accept that *the* pudgala [MSA 18.103d<sup>2</sup>] [really] exists, for if it exists, [all] the [afore-mentioned] evils [will] necessarily follow.

## 5. Text-critical remarks

L155,25 reads: *nopalabdhā*, against MS A 154b3 (*nopalabdho*) and MS B 141a5 (*nopalabdho*). Read: *nopalabdho* (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 1).

L155,29 reads: *na ca viparyāsaḥ*, against MS A 154b3 (*na cāvīpariyāsaḥ*), MS B 141b1 (*na cāvīpariyāsaḥ*), MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b1–2 (*phyin ci ma log pa [...] ma yin no*) and MSAVBh tsi D164b6–7/P193b4 (*phyin ci ma log pa [...] mi [...]*). Read: *na cāvīpariyāsaḥ* (to be compared with Lévi 1911:261n. 2).

L155,30 reads: *na caiṣa saṃkleśa iti*, against MS A 154b6 (*sa caiṣa saṃkleśa iti*), MS B 141b1 (*sa caiṣa saṃkleśa iti*), MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P261b2 (*de kun nas ñon moṇs pa yin no zes bya bar*) and MSAVBh tsi D165a1/P193b7 (*de kun nas ñon moṇs pa yin par*). Read: *sa caiṣa saṃkleśa iti* (see already Lévi 1911:261n. 3).

L156,3 reads: *ekatvānyatvato vācyas*, against L154,30 (*ekatvānyatvato 'vācyas*), MS B 141b3 (*ekatvānyatvato 'vācyas*), MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P261b3–4 (*gcig dañ gzan du brjod bya min*), MSAVBh tsi D165b2/P194b1 (*gcig dañ tha dad mi brjod de*); the reading of MS A 155a2 (*ekatvānyatvato vācyas*) is of course no argument in favour of *ekatvānyatvato vācyas*. Read: *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyas* (see already Lévi 1911:259n. 93.1.a).

L157,3, MS A 156a3, MS B 142a7 and MSAVBh tsi D169a5/P199a2 (*gñis la brten nas*) read: *dvayaṃ praṭītya*, against L155,3 (*dvaye sati ca*) and MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P268a7–8 (*gñis yod [\*dvaye sati ca]*). I have read: *dvayaṃ praṭītya*.

123 To be compared with AKBh 472,7–11/LE118,3–7: *yadi cātmā bhavet tathāgatā eva suvyak-taṃ paśyeyuḥ / paśyatāṃ cātmagrāho dṛḍhatarāḥ syāt / ātmani ca saty ātmīyaṃ bhavatīti sūtre vacanād\* ātmīyagrāho 'py eṣāṃ skandheṣv adhikaṃ pravarteta / saiṣāṃ syāt sat-kāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ / ātmīyadr̥ṣṭau ca satyāṃ ātmīyasnehaḥ / evaṃ eṣāṃ dṛḍhatarātmātmīyasne-haparigāhitabandhanānāṃ mokṣo dūratarībhavet /*. \*LE118n. 534 refers to SŚ (462b27), T 1, 765b28, MN I.138, sutta no. 22.

L157,5 (but also MS A 153a5 and MS B 140b4, which correspond to L155,5!) reads: *svāmitve sati vā-*, against L155,5 (but also MS A 156a4 and MS B 142b1, which correspond to L157,5!), which reads: *svāmitve sati cā-*. In other words, L155,5 reads *cā-* against the manuscripts (*vā-*), and L157,5 reads *vā-* against the manuscripts (*cā-*). Neither MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P260b7 = P262a8 (*bdag po ñid cig yin na ni // mi rtag mi 'dod 'byuñ mi byed*) nor the *pratīka* in MSAVBh *tsi* D169b1–2/P199a6 (*bdag po yin na mi rtag dan // mi 'dod pa ni 'byuñ mi byed*) does not allow a decision. I have read: *svāmitve sati vā-*.

L157,6 reads: *svāmībhavann aniṣṭaṃ vijñānam*, against MS A 156a5 (*svāmī bhavan* [sic] *iṣṭavijñānam* [sic]), MS B 142b1 (*svāmī bhavan* [sic] *iṣṭaṃ vijñānam*), MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262a8–b1 (*bdag po ñid gcig yin na ni rnam par śes pa 'dod pa*). Read: *svāmī bhavann iṣṭaṃ vijñānam* (see already Lévi 1911:262n. 4a).

On L157,10–11 (*yadi dravyato* [...] *rūpaprasādādi*), see above, n. 89.

L157,15, MS A 156b3 and MS B 142b6 read: *tīrthyā°*, against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b5 (*gžan mu stegs can* [*\*anyatīrthyā°*] (no *pratīka* in MSAVBh)). Read: *tīrthyā°*.

L157,17, MS A 156b5, MS B 142b7 and MSAVBh *tsi* D171a2/P201a4 (*lta ba la sogs pa*) read: *darśanādiṣu*, against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b6–7 (*de lta ba la sogs pa la* [*\*sa darśanādiṣu*]). Read: *darśanādiṣu*.

L157,18–19, MS A 156,5–6 and MS B 142b7–143a1 read: *svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikaḥ* (*ākasmika* MSS A and B) / *tatpratrayo* [...], against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P262b7 (see also MSAVBh *tsi* D171a5/P201a7–8), which reads: *rañ byuñ ba glo bur ba'am / de'i rkyen las* [...], i.e., *\*svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikas tatpratrayo vā* /. I have read: *svayambhūr vā bhaved ākasmikas tatpratrayo vā* / (see already Lévi 1911:263n. 5).

L158,13, MS A 157b1, MS B 143b1 and MSAVBh *tsi* D171a2/P201a4 (*de'i rkyen las byuñ ba yin na ni*) read: *sati hi tatpratrayatve*, against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263a5–6 (*de de'i rkyen ñid yin na ni* [*\*sati hi tasmin tatpratrayatve*]). Read: *sati hi tatpratrayatve*.

L158,21, MS A 157b7, MS B 143b5 and MSAVBh *tsi* D173b7/P204b2 (*rnam par smin pa*) read: *vipākah*, against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b1 (*las kyi rnam par smin pa* [*\*karmavipākah*]). Read: *vipākah*.

L158,23 and MS B 143b6 read: *iti deśitā*, which makes no sense in the absence of a feminine subject. MS A 157b9 reads *iti dejitāh* [sic], which might be construed with *pañcādīnavāḥ* (*ātmopalambha [iti]* being, then, in the nominative [“five evils have been taught to be/as the perception of a self”]). MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b2, however, clearly interprets *ātmopalambha* as a locative (*bdag tu dmigs pa la ñes dmigs lña ste* [...] *žes bśad de* /). Moreover, and in the same context, L158,20 and L158,22 read: *iti deśitam*. I have read: *iti deśitam*.

L159,3, MS A 158a4 and MS B 144a2 read: *saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca*, against L155,15, MS A 154a3 and MS B 140b7 (and L159,5, MS A 158a5 and MS B 144a3), which read: *saṃkleśavyavadāne ca*. *saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca* can only be in the locative case, while *saṃkleśavyavadāne ca* can also be, as a dual, in the nominative case (this might have been Sthiramati’s understanding, who puts the six terms involved on the same level in MSAVBh *tsi* D174b6–7/P205b4–5 (*kun nas ñon moñs pa tha dad pa dañ / rnam par byañ ba tha dad pa dañ / gnas pa tha dad pa dañ / chad pa tha dad pa dañ / ’jug pa tha dad pa dañ / rgyud tha dad pa dag bstan du mi ruñ gi* [...])). I am inclined to read both as locatives (for the singular *dvandva*, see Renou 1996:104, §86B and BHSG §23.2–3), as MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b5–6 and MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P263b6 (both with genitive particles: “of pollution and purification” in the sense “in/(concerning) pollution and purification”) also seem to reflect. (The *pratīkas* in MSAVBh *tsi* D174b5–6/P205b3–4 and MSAVBh *tsi* D175b1–2/P206a8–b1 are of little use.) In the reading: *saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca*, the particule *ca* needs not be interpreted as connecting MSA 18.102 to MSA 18.101, a function that seems to be that of *hi*. Although the singular *dvandva* is represented twice (L155,15 and L159,5), I have read: *saṃkleśe vyavadāne ca*.

L159,11–12, MS A 158b2, MS B 144a7 read: *yenāsati dravyato ’stitive*, against MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P264a3 (*ci’i phyir* [*kena?*] instead of *yena*) and MSAVBh *tsi* D176b6/P207b8 (*de’i phyir* [*tena?*] instead of *yena*). Read: *yenāsati dravyato ’stitive*.

L159,15 reads: *anūtpādyā*. Read: *anutpādyā*.

L159,20 reads: *sarveṣāṃ na dṛṣṭasatyānām*, against MS A 158a6–7 (*sarveṣāṃm* [sic] *adṛṣṭasatyānām*), MS B 144b3 (*sarveṣāṃ adṛṣṭasatyānām*) and MSABh<sub>tib</sub> P264a5 (*bden pa ma mthoñ ba thams cad*). Read: *sarveṣāṃ adṛṣṭasatyānām*.

L160,2 reads: *yathāpūrvam*. Read: *yathā pūrvam*.

### *Daṇḍas*

L155,27: *viparyāsāt tathā*. Read: *viparyāsāt / tathā*

L156,17: *ekatvenānyatvena ca agnir*. Read: *ekatvenānyatvena ca / agnir*

L156,21: *upalabdhēs tathā*. Read: *upalabdheḥ / tathā*

L156,22: *tatrendhanam iti ata*. Read: *tatrendhanam iti / ata*

L156,23: *dvayena hi upalabdher*. Read: *dvayena hi / upalabdher*

L157,7: *aniṣṭaṃ ca / naiva*. Read: *aniṣṭaṃ ca naiva /*

L157,18–19: *ākasmikaḥ / tatpratyaayo*. Read: *ākasmikas tatpratyaayo (vā)*

L158,6: *vijñātā sati*. Read: *vijñātā / sati*

L158,20: *deśitaṃ paramārtha°*. Read: *deśitaṃ / paramārtha°*

L158,22: *pratisaṃdadhāti / anyatra*. Read: *pratisaṃdadhāty anyatra*

L158,23: *jīvadṛṣṭiḥ nirviśeṣo*. Read: *jīvadṛṣṭiḥ / nirviśeṣo*

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